Bankruptcy: Punitive Damages - Failure to Return Vehicle

     Judge Tice of the United States Bankruptcy Court, in Richmond, in the case of Brown v. Town & Country Sales and Service, Inc., ruled that a creditor that repeatedly refused to give the debtors’ pickup truck back to the debtors, despite the debtors’ entitlement to the truck after they filed for bankruptcy, violated the automatic stay in bankruptcy and must pay debtors’ attorney’s fees and punitive damages. 

     The creditor’s registered agent testified at trial that, despite the fact that they had always returned repossessed property post-petition in the past, the creditor elected not to return debtors’ vehicle. Instead, she testified that this time the creditor decided it would not return debtors’ vehicle upon demand because the creditor was unhappy that a large number of its customers had declared bankruptcy in the past year. 

     The debtors provided the lender with proof of adequate insurance. The debtors were currently awaiting confirmation of their modified Chapter 13 plan in which the debtors proposed to pay the lender in full. The debtors owed the lender $1,689.02 for the initial truck loan, as well as $1,764.95 for the replacement motor, for a total of $3,453.97. 

     The Court concluded that the creditor’s demand for full payment, coupled with its inaction and retention of the vehicle, amount to an exercise of control sufficient to find a violation of the automatic stay for failure to turn over the vehicle pursuant to Bankruptcy Code §542(a). The Bankruptcy Court ruled that the debtors were entitled to recover the truck upon filing bankruptcy. Thus, the creditor’s retention of the vehicle post-petition constituted an exercise of control in violation of the automatic stay and Bankruptcy Code §362(h), which permits a court to impose attorney’s fees, costs and punitive damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay. The Court awarded these. 

   The Bankruptcy Court further awarded punitive damages against the creditor in the form of cancellation of both of the creditor’s security interests against debtors’ vehicle. Any balance which debtors owed the creditor was treated as an unsecured claim. 

   The lesson in Brown - know the rules and always consult experienced counsel.

Bankruptcy: Bank's Security Interest - Stocks pledged as Security

     In the case of Winters v. George Mason Bank the United States District Court, reviewing a case from the United States Bankruptcy Court at Alexandria, Virginia, affirmed a ruling for the creditor bank which enforced the bank's security interest against stocks held jointly by a mother and daughter and pledged as collateral for the bank's loan (actually a series of loans) to the daughter and her husband (which were in default), even though the daughter and her husband had declared bankruptcy. 

     The District Court found that from over the course of three years the plaintiff signed a total of three commercial pledge agreements pledging as collateral her interest in the stocks. In the second of three years the daughter and her husband filed a bankruptcy petition. The plaintiff argued that because she and her daughter jointly owned the stocks, those stocks were part of the bankruptcy estate. The plaintiff also argued that the second pledge agreement was an act to create or perfect a lien against that property, and thus violated the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code. The District Court ruled, however, that the automatic stay did not apply to non-bankrupt codebtors, nor did the automatic stay prevent actions against guarantors of loans. The District Court further stated that even if the agreement violated the stay as to the debtors, the agreement did not violate the stay as to the plaintiff. The District Court found that the plaintiff's attempt to use the automatic stay to her own benefit contradicted the purpose behind the stay provision. The plaintiff sought to use the automatic stay to avoid an agreement that was beneficial to the bankruptcy estate, and an agreement that she and the debtors had voluntarily entered into. Accordingly, the District Court upheld the bank's lien.

Bankruptcy: Motion to Annul Automatic Stay upon Debtor's Third Petition

     In the case of Blue Ridge Bank v. Boswell the United States Bankruptcy Court at Roanoke, Virginia, denied the creditor bank's motion to annul the automatic stay. 

     In Boswell the debtor had twice previously, just prior to the bank's scheduled foreclosure sales, filed a bankruptcy petition on the eve of foreclosure. With each of the two bankruptcy filings, the debtor failed to provide schedules, a statement of financial affairs or a plan. When the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the debtor's second petition, the Court ordered the debtor not to file another petition for 180 days from the entry of the original order of dismissal. The debtor complied with this order. 

     The bank scheduled a third foreclosure sale, and at the same time, the debtor presented a letter from her attorney indicating that a third bankruptcy petition had been filed. The bank proceeded with the sale, announcing that the sale would be subject to bankruptcy court confirmation. After the sale, the bank moved to annul the automatic stay, arguing that the Court had discretion to validate actions taken in violation of the stay. 

     The Bankruptcy Court found as fact that the foreclosure trustee was advised by the bank and its counsel to proceed with the foreclosure sale of the debtor's residence, and that each was fully aware of the debtor's Chapter 13 petition. At the same time, the foreclosure trustee chose not to consult with the debtor, who was in attendance at the sale, or the debtor's attorney, whose identity was known to the trustee. In fact, the foreclosure trustee received only the bank's point of view and then obtained indemnification from the bank for any personal liability resulting from the sale. The Bankruptcy Court noted that under Virginia law, a trustee under a deed of trust is a fiduciary for both the debtor and the creditor and must treat them with perfect fairness and impartiality. 

     The Bankruptcy Court ruled that its dismissal of the debtor's second petition prohibited the debtor from filing any petition for a period of 180 days from entry of the original order of dismissal. The debtor filed her Chapter 13 petition nine days after the prohibitory period had expired. The debtor acted in accordance with the Court's directive and with her rights under the Bankruptcy Court. Further, the bankruptcy trustee reported that the debtor was current in her plan payments and that he was prepared to recommend confirmation. The Bankruptcy Court noted that such evidence did not support a finding that the debtor was abusing the bankruptcy process. 

     Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court declined to annul the automatic stay of Bankruptcy Code §362, and the bank's motion to annul the stay was denied. 

Bankruptcy: Vehicle Repossessions/Automatic Stay

     The United States District Court of Abingdon, Virginia, in the case of Nationsbank N.A. v. Bush reversed a Bankruptcy Court decision finding that the creditor bank had violated the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay against actions by creditor's against bankrupt debtors.
     The District Court found that in order for the bank to have violated the automatic stay, the bank must have known of the debtor's filing. The District Court found that the notice of filing was mailed to the proper address and was not subsequently returned undelivered may support the conclusion that the bank received notice, it does not support the conclusion that the bank received the notice before the sale date. The issue was not whether the bank ever received notice, but when the bank received the notice. The District Court found that there was no evidence from which the Bankruptcy Court could have found that the bank received the notice before the sale.
     Despite the favorable ruling, creditors should be very careful to establish a checking system so that violations will not occur. The penalty for violations range from jail time to fines and attorney's fees.

 

Bankruptcy: Relief from Automatic Stay - Lack of Adequate Protection

     In the case of Equitable Life Assurance Society of U.S. v. James River Associates, the United States District Court at Newport News upheld a Bankruptcy Court ruling that where a creditor held a note executed by a debtor and secured by a first deed of trust on a hotel and a conference center in Williamsburg, Virginia, the creditor was entitled to relief from the automatic stay in order to foreclose because the creditor's "equity cushion" in the property was only two percent.

     In the trial of this case, the Bankruptcy Court found that the creditor was not adequately protected because 1) its equity cushion was deteriorating as interest accrued, 2) real estate taxes were delinquent, 3) the creditor had not received payments on the note for numerous months and 4) the priming lien necessary for the debtor to reorganize would further deteriorate the creditor's security position.
     On appeal to the District Court the debtor argued that the Bankruptcy Court erred in its finding that the creditor's equity cushion was deteriorating due to the accumulation of unpaid interest. The District Court opined that under the "equity cushion" theory if a debtor has equity in a property sufficient to shield the creditor from either the declining value of the collateral or an increase in the claim from accrual of interest or expenses, then the creditor is protected. The District Court ruled that the Bankruptcy Court's conclusion that the creditor was inadequately protected because of the deterioration of its equity cushion from accumulating interest was not in error. The District Court noted that although several courts had previously rejected the equity cushion theory, it did not need to decide the merits of the equity cushion theory since the Bankruptcy Court found that there were other sufficient justifications for finding a lack of adequate protection. These are detailed in the following paragraphs:
     First, the Bankruptcy Court found that the real estate taxes were delinquent for two tax years in a total amount of $264,624. The District Court ruled that the failure to pay real estate taxes may constitute a basis for finding lack of adequate protection.
     Second, the Bankruptcy Court found that there was a lack of payments to the creditor for several months, including, no payments since the bankruptcy petition. The District Court ruled that a continued failure to make monthly payments under loan documents can constitute cause for granting relief from the automatic stay. The District Court ruled that there was no error in granting relief from the automatic stay for failure to make payments.
     Third, the Bankruptcy Court found that the creditor's security position would be deteriorated by the proposed priming lien which the debtor needed to reorganize. Given the lack of an equity cushion and the speculative nature of the repayment plan, the District Court ruled that there was no error in granting relief from the automatic stay because of the deterioration of the creditor's security position due to the priming loan.
     In conclusion, the District Court concluded that the Bankruptcy Court did not err in granting the creditor's motion for relief from the automatic stay. The Bankruptcy Court properly found that the diminishing equity cushion, the delinquent real estate taxes, the lack of payments on the note for several months, and the deterioration of the creditor's security position under the priming lien constitute, both independently and together, a lack of adequate protection for the creditor.

Bankruptcy: The Automatic Stay

     Federal Bankruptcy law provides for an automatic stay (injunction) to take effect immediately upon filing for bankruptcy. The stay prevents creditors from taking any further action against debtors without court approval. The stay can stop a foreclosure or vehicle auction, even if notice of the filing is given moments before the sale is to occur. The automatic stay, unless lifted by the Bankruptcy Judge, or in some cases the trustee, remains in effect until it is terminated at the time of discharge, at which time it is replaced by a permanent injunction.
     Violation of the automatic stay is a serious offense. A willful violation can result in a finding of contempt of court. Sanctions for violating the stay can be awarded as well. These sanctions can include a fine and/or an assessment of attorney’s fees. A finding of contempt of court is also punishable by a jail sentence. Attorney consultation is always recommended when action against bankrupt debtors is contemplated.
     The automatic stay may be lifted upon proper motion and argument by creditor's counsel. Reasons for making such a motion include, among others, lack of insurance on the property, or other similar reasons resulting in the creditor being unprotected while its rights are being determined.