Monday, April 15, 2024

Real Estate: Common Area Parking Spaces Must be Assigned Equally

The Court of Appeals of Virginia recently issued an opinion affirming a Circuit Court decision holding that common area parking spaces must be assigned equally. The case involved a suit by a homeowner, Patrick Batt, against Manchester Oaks subdivision in Fairfax County. The subdivision contained 57 townhouses, 30 of which were constructed with a garage and driveway (garaged lots) and 27 of which were constructed with an additional bedroom and bathroom in lieu of a garage (ungaraged lots). The subdivision included a common area with 72 parking spaces.

The subdivision was subject to a declaration, administered by the homeowners association that gave the association the right to designate a maximum of two parking spaces for the exclusive use of each lot owner. However, the association was not required to ensure that parking spaces were available to any particular owner or to oversee use of the parking spaces. Batt had purchased a garaged lot in 1990, before the subdivision was complete. At that time, residents parked wherever they chose. In 1993 or 1994, the developer began assigning two parking spaces to each ungaraged lot. The remaining 18 parking spaces were designated as “visitor” parking, available to all lot owners on a first-come, first-served basis. 

In 2009, the association issued one visitor parking permit to each lot owner and posted a parking policy on its website. Any vehicle not displaying a permit while parked in the visitor parking spaces would be towed. In December 2009, the association amended the declaration to provide that the association had the right to designate two parking spaces exclusively to each of the ungaraged lot owners on a non-uniform and preferential basis. In June 2010, Batt sued the association, claiming that the unequal treatment of owners over parking space assignments violated the declaration. The association argued that Batt’s suit was barred by the December 2009 amendment to the declaration.

The circuit court ruled in Batt’s favor, finding that the amendment was invalid for six reasons. The association appealed. The Court of Appeals ruled, in summary, that equality is inherent in the definition of “common area.” A “common area” is defined as, “[a]n area owned and used in common by residents of a condominium, subdivision, or planned-unit development.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “in common” to mean “[s]hared equally with others, undivided into separately owned parts.” Accordingly, the court held that the association must assign common area parking spaces to all lot owners equally, if at all, unless the declaration expressly provided otherwise. In this case, the court did not find that unequal assignment was authorized.

Monday, April 8, 2024

Bankruptcy: Dischargeability of Debt - False Financial Statement

In the case of I. H. Mississippi Valley Credit Union v. O'Connor the United States Bankruptcy Court at Richmond, Virginia, reviewed the creditor's complaint objecting to dischargeability pursuant to two sections of Bankruptcy Code §523.

In O'Connor the debtor was involved in a scheme with a car dealer to buy and sell "grey market" Mercedes Benz in Germany and then bring them to the United States to be refitted for sale at a profit, after which the dealer would pay off the credit union loan and split the profits with the debtor. During the conduct of this business, the debtor provided to the credit union an inaccurate vehicle identification number (VIN) on a loan application and also failed to list a loan from another credit union on an application.

The Court found as fact that the debtor made misrepresentations as to the vehicle identification number and the existence of the Mercedes, and that the credit union relied on the existence of such an automobile in making the loan to the debtor. However, the Court found that the credit union did not meet its burden to show that the debtor knew that the representations were false when made. The debtor gave the loan officer the VIN appearing on the bill of sale from the car dealer, and although the insurance company requested from the debtor a corrected VIN for insurance purposes, the credit union presented no other relevant evidence that would show that the debtor knew that the VIN was false at the time he applied for the loan.

The credit union argued that the debtor showed reckless disregard for the truth in not checking to verify that the VIN provided by the car dealer was accurate or that there existed a Mercedes Benz automobile. The Court, however, was not inclined to find reckless disregard for the truth. In regard to the VIN, the Court noted that in a majority of automobile purchases the buyer does not compare the VIN written on the bill of sale against the VIN on the automobile itself, nor does the buyer call the VIN in to the manufacturer's corporate headquarters for verification. In regard to the Mercedes, the Court found that there was no reason for the debtor to have doubted the existence of the vehicle. The debtor's only interest in the vehicle was that it could be refitted by the car dealer and then resold at a profit. Further, the debtor had already successfully conducted two such transactions with the credit union without seeing either of the cars involved in these transactions.

The Court ruled that the debtor's representations regarding the VIN and the existence of the Mercedes Benz automobile were not made in reckless disregard to the truth. Further, the Court ruled that the credit union had failed to show any intent to deceive on the part of the debtor in making such representations. Accordingly, the Court ruled that Bankruptcy Code §523 (a)(2)(A) did not render the debt nondischargeable.

The Credit Union also raised the issue on nondischargeability based upon material false financial statements pursuant to Bankruptcy Code §523 (a)(2)(B). The Court took evidence from the credit union regarding information written by a loan officer on the loan request form as well as the written deposition of that officer. The Court found as fact that a loan to another credit union was not included on the loan request forms to the plaintiff credit union. The Court noted that in deciding the issue of materiality the Court must determine whether the credit union would have made the loan knowing of the outstanding obligation to another credit union, considering what weight the plaintiff credit union gives to its debt-to-income ration limit. The Court noted that the evidence by the credit union was not clear as to what debt-to-income ratio would have disqualified the debtor. The Court observed that a limit of 35 percent appeared on the form, but the debtor was approved with a debt-to-income ration higher than 35 percent. The Court decided that it was more probable than not that under the totality of circumstances of this particular fact situation that the credit union relied not on the debt-to-income ration, but instead on the debtor's high professional salary, low living expenses, and an established relationship in which during the past ten months two $20,000 "grey market" loans were paid off about the time of the due date of the first monthly installment. The Court concluded that the credit union's reliance on the debtor's false financial statement was not reasonable. Accordingly, the Court ruled that Bankruptcy Code §523 (a)(2)(B) did not render the debt nondischargeable.

Monday, April 1, 2024

Collections: Bank Denied Lawyer Fees Due to Problem in the Guaranty

In the case of Jefferson National Bank v. Estate of Frogale, a Loudoun County Circuit Court Judge denied the award of attorney's fees to a bank because the guaranty agreement did not have a provision for attorney's fees even though the promissory note clearly provided for 25% attorney's fees. The Loudoun Court found that the guaranty referred only to collection of "charges or costs" upon default. The Court ruled that this language was ambiguous, and as such, construed the ambiguity against the bank because they drafted the documents.

In Frogale a corporation defaulted in the payment of a note and the bank sued the note's guarantor. The guarantor filed a motion for summary judgment regarding the question of the guarantor's liability for attorney's fees. The Loudoun Court reviewed the Virginia Supreme Court case of Mahoney v. Nationsbank. In Mahoney the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that a note and guaranty are two separate agreements, but each must be construed in the light of the other. In doing so, the Loudoun Court stated that it was "crucial that the bank chose to distinguish in the Note between 'all other applicable fees, costs and charges' and attorney's fees; and that it chose not to place a specific attorney fee obligation in the guaranty." The Loudoun Court pointed out that the bank could have placed an attorney's fee provision in the guaranty just as it had done in the note.

The lesson of Frogale is that you should be careful that when you have guaranties you ensure that the language in the guaranty "mirrors" the language in the promissory note - without mirror language, there can be a problem, with mirror language, ambiguity should not be an issue.

Monday, March 25, 2024

Foreclosure: Notice of Sale

The Code of Virginia provides specific guidance as to giving notice of a foreclosure sale.

§55-59.1 requires that the written notice of sale contain the time, date and place of the proposed sale, as well as either (i) the instrument number, or, deed book and page number, of the instrument of appointment filed pursuant to §55-59-59 (appointment of substitute trustee), or, (ii) a copy of the executed and notarized appointment of substitute trustee. Personal delivery or mailing a copy of the advertisement by certified or registered mail is sufficient.

§55-59.1 requires the trustee to send written notice of the time, date and place of the sale to (i) the present owner of the property … (ii) any subordinate lienholder … (iii) any assignee of such note … (iv) any condominium unit owner’s association that has filed a lien … (v) any property owner’s association that has filed a lien … (vi) any proprietary lessees’ association that has filed a lien.

It is important to know that in addition to the notice required by statute, the note or the deed of trust may contain additional notice requirements. Accordingly, the trustee should examine both of these documents.

§55-59 provides that the notice can be sent by either the trustee or the lender.

Monday, March 18, 2024

Real Estate: The Virginia Property Owners’ Association Act – Memorandums of Lien

The Virginia Property Owners’ Association Act specifically provides for remedies outside of the more common remedy of filing suit for the amount owed and receiving a judgment. A memorandum of lien to a holder of a credit line deed of trust under the Act is given in the same fashion as if the association’s lien were a judgment. Under the Act, the association can file for and perfect a lien against the homeowner that is prior to all other subsequent liens and encumbrances except real estate tax liens, liens and encumbrances recorded prior to the recordation of the declaration, and sums unpaid on and owing under any mortgage or deed of trust recorded prior to perfection of this lien.

To perfect the memorandum of lien, the association must file with the clerk of the circuit court in the county or city in which the development is situated a memorandum verified by the oath of the principal officer of the association or another officer provided for in the declaration. The memorandum must be filed within 12 months from the first assessment became due and payable. Additionally, prior to filing a memorandum of lien, a written notice must be sent to the property owner by certified mail, at the owner’s last known address, informing the owner that the lien will be filed in the circuit court clerk’s office at least 10 days before the actual filing date of the lien. The memorandum must name the development, describe the lot, name the person(s) constituting the owners of the lot, list the amount of unpaid assessments currently due or past due relative to such lot together with the date when each fell due, list the date of issuance of the memorandum, name the association with a name and address of the contact for the person to contact to arrange for payment or release of the lien, and state that the association is obtaining a lien in accordance with the provisions of the Virginia Property Owners’ Association act as set forth in Chapter 26 (section 55-508 et seq.) of Title 55.

The Act provides that a judgment or decree in this action must include, without limitation, reimbursement for costs and reasonable attorney’s fees for the prevailing party. Also, if the association prevails, it may also recover interest at the legal rate for the sums secured by the lien from the time each sum became due and payable. If the owner then satisfies the debt, the lien must be released, and failure to release the lien results in a penalty.

Once a lien has been perfected, the association must enforce the lien within 36 months from the time when the memorandum of lien was recorded. This time period cannot be extended.

Monday, March 11, 2024

Bankruptcy: ERISA Funds, the Bankruptcy Estate and Homestead Exemptions

In the case of Philips v. Bottoms Judge Payne of the United States District Court at Richmond, Virginia, upheld a Bankruptcy Court ruling that the Virginia homestead exemption, Virginia Code §34-34, was not preempted by ERISA, and that the bankruptcy trustee could claim a portion of an individual retirement account (IRA) not funded by the debtor’s funds from an ERISA-qualified plan.

In Phillips it was disputed that the IRA was not an ERISA-qualified plan. However, because the debtors used funds from an ERISA-qualified plan to create the IRA, the debtors contended that the exemption applicable to an ERISA-qualified plan exempted the IRA because it was created by funds having their origin in such a plan. The Bankruptcy Court held that the IRA was property of the bankrupt estate and that Virginia Code §34-34 was not preempted by ERISA. The Court further held that the debtor’s claimed exemption should be allowed in the amount of $21,532.

In the Bankruptcy Court the trustee sought to thwart the claim that the IRA funds were partially exempt by arguing that Virginia Code §34-34 was preempted by ERISA and therefore was not available to protect any part of the IRA from the claims of creditors. The Bankruptcy Court allowed $21,532 of the $48,858 in interest in the IRA because the parties had agreed that if an exemption was allowable at all, that was the correct amount.

The District Court, in its review, found that although the federal bankruptcy provisions permitted exemption of a payment under a pension to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent, Virginia had enacted an alternative exemption provision, found in Virginia Code §34-34. The state provision, like the federal one it replaced, limited the exemption of retirement benefits. However, rather than limiting the exemption to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and his dependents, the Virginia law provided instead that the exemption should not apply to the extent that the interest of the individual in the retirement plan would provides annual benefit in excess of $17,500. The District Court concluded that given the legislative intent underlying the Bankruptcy Code, it was logical to conclude that the limit on pension plan exemptions was Virginia’s attempt to set an exemption level appropriate for the Commonwealth, precisely as was envisioned by Congress when it revised the Bankruptcy Code.

The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s decisions that the debtor’s interest in the IRA was part of the bankruptcy estate and that Virginia Code §34-34, even if theoretically preempted by §514(a) of ERISA, was saved from preemption by §514(d) of ERISA.

Monday, March 4, 2024

Collections: The IRS Can Be Helpful in Commercial Collections

Can you imagine using the IRS to help in collections? I can! I have an interesting technique that I have recommended for over twenty two years – I first ran an article on this in the May, 1992 (the 4th Edition) of Creditor’s News! Since recently others have also begun recommending this technique I thought that I would review it again.

After a sufficient amount of time has passed to consider a commercial credit account "uncollectible," the creditor should consider writing off the debt as a potentially tax-deductible bad debt. The creditor's loss may then become the debtor's gain and, as such, may be reported to the IRS on Form 1099 as income to that debtor.

Before actually writing off the debt, attempts should be made to contact the debtor and advise him of the intended action. If you do not have the debtor's social security number, try including a W-9 form with your letter. This could evoke some favorable response.

I have a form letter that I recently revised to accomplish all of this. The letter (written from the perspective of the creditor itself) advises the debtor that his account is seriously past due despite repeated attempts to make arrangements for payment. The debtor is further advised that unless the debt is paid in full within fifteen (15) days from the date of the letter, the creditor will, at its option, report the loss to the IRS on their form 1099c. This reporting will result in taxable income to the debtor (reference IRS Regulation S1.61-12). This reporting will result in an IRS audit risk to the debtor, as the IRS routinely runs computer matches of the 1099’s filed against tax returns actually filed to insure that all income is reported; there are severe penalties if not. The letter further states that the creditor is demanding the debtor’s tax identification information; the debtor is asked to do so within fifteen (15) days. The debtor must provide this information to the creditor under penalty of federal law. I recommend that you send with the letter a copy of the IRS form W-9 evidencing the unpaid debt, and advise the debtor that if you do not receive the W-9, the creditor will, at its option, file an IRS form 1099c incomplete. This will further increase the debtor’s chances of an audit.

Many debtors will wish to resolve the debt as a result of these actions. After all, who wants the IRS checking them out?

Monday, February 19, 2024

Foreclosure: Substitute Trustees

Question: What happens if the trustee under your deed of trust is either unavailable, or, is no longer the person you desire to serve as trustee? 

Answer: You can appoint a substitute trustee. Under Virginia Code Section 55-59(9), the noteholder, or, the holders of greater than fifty percent of the monetary obligation secured by the deed of trust, have the right and the power to appoint a substitute trustee or trustees for any reason, regardless of whether such right is expressly granted in the deed of trust. The timing of your action is important. The trustee must be empowered before taking action – this occurs when the instrument of appointment has been executed. You do not have to wait for recording. However, as Virginia Code Section 55-59(9) states that the appointment of a substitute trustee shall be recorded before, or at the time of, the recording of the deed conveying the property (such as after a foreclosure).

Question:  Can a lender appoint their counsel as trustee? 

Answer: Yes. Virginia Code Section 26-58 holds that a trustee is not disqualified merely because he is a stockholder, member, employee, officer or director or counsel to the lender.

Monday, February 12, 2024

Real Estate: The Virginia Property Owners’ Association Act – General Provisions

In the last issue of Creditor News I began a review of the Virginia Property Owners’ Act. Under the Act, sellers are required to disclose in their sales contract that the property is located within a development subject to the Act. The Act also requires the seller to retrieve the Disclosure Packet in the Act and provide it to the purchaser. The Disclosure Packet includes the following information: association documents, the name of the association, state of incorporation, register agent’s name and address, any other entity/facility to which the owner may owe fees or charges, budget or summary, income/expenses statement or balance sheet for last fiscal year, statement of balance due of outstanding loans, nature/status of pending lawsuits, unpaid judgments (with material impact on association or members or relating to lot being purchased), insurance coverage provided for lot owners including fidelity bond maintained by association, and much more.

The purchaser may cancel the contract within three days if delivered by hand or email, or six days if sent by mail, after receiving the Disclosure Packet or being notified that it is “not available” (meaning: a current annual report has not been filed by the Association with either the SCC or the CICB; or the seller has requested in writing that the packet be provided and it is not received within 14 days; or the association has provided written notice that the Disclosure Packet is not available). Additionally, if the Disclosure Packet is not delivered or the association does not indicate that it is not available, the purchaser may cancel the sale any time prior to closing. If the purchaser received the Disclosure Packet, the owner also has the right to request an update. However, the rights to receive and cancel the contract are waived conclusively if not exercised before settlement.

Failure to provide a Disclosure Packet after a written request for it has been made results in a waiver of any claim to delinquent assessments or violations of association documents up to that point, and the association will be liable to the seller for actual damages sustained up to $1,000 if the association is managed by a CIC Manager or up to $500 if it is self-managed.

In the next two issues of Creditor News, I will discuss the provisions of the Virginia Property Owners’ Association Act that provide a memorandum of lien and foreclosure in the event of an owner’s default.  

Monday, February 5, 2024

Bankruptcy: The Automatic Stay

Federal Bankruptcy law provides for an automatic stay (injunction) to take effect immediately upon filing for bankruptcy. The stay prevents creditors from taking any further action against debtors without court approval. The stay can stop a foreclosure or vehicle auction, even if notice of the filing is given moments before the sale is to occur. The automatic stay, unless lifted by the Bankruptcy Judge, or in some cases the trustee, remains in effect until it is terminated at the time of discharge, at which time it is replaced by a permanent injunction.
 
Violation of the automatic stay is a serious offense. A willful violation can result in a finding of contempt of court. Sanctions for violating the stay can be awarded as well. These sanctions can include a fine and/or an assessment of attorney’s fees. A finding of contempt of court is also punishable by a jail sentence. Attorney consultation is always recommended when action against bankrupt debtors is contemplated.
 
The automatic stay may be lifted upon proper motion and argument by creditor's counsel. Reasons for making such a motion include, among others, lack of insurance on the property, or other similar reasons resulting in the creditor being unprotected while his rights are being determined.

Monday, January 29, 2024

Collections: Notice of Sale of Security Interest

The case of The State Bank of the Alleghenies v. Hundall, decided by the United States District Court at Roanoke, Virginia, serves as a good example of what happens where a creditor sells items pledged as security for a loan without making proper notice to all parties

In Hundall, the defendant guaranteed the bank's loan to his brother for a dry-cleaning business, but the defendant guarantor never received notice of how, when and by what manner of sale the bank intended to sell motor vehicles belonging to the brother's business. The evidence taken clearly proved that the bank failed to send notice of the sale of the motor vehicles, which had a fair wholesale value of approximately $8,500.00 in the aggregate. The District Court ruled that this violated the provisions of Virginia Code §8.9-504(3); however, the Code does not provide a remedy for the failure to comply with the statutory provisions for resale, and the appropriate remedy had not been ruled upon by the Virginia Supreme Court. The District Court, in its ruling, cited that courts which have addressed this appropriate remedy for failure to provide notice have adopted one (1) of the following three (3) rules:

1.        The debtor must prove that he has suffered an injury in order to obtain any recovery against the secured party;

2.        The secured party is absolutely barred from recovering a deficiency, even if the debtor suffered no injury; and

3.        A rebuttable presumption is that the collateral was worth the amount of the debt which requires the secured party to prove that the debtor suffered no injury.

Virginia Code §8.9-507(1) entitles the debtor, or any person entitled to notification, "to recover from the secured party any loss caused by the failure to comply with the provision of this part".

The Court elected the third of the three remedies listed above, and forced the creditor to prove the fair value of the collateral.

The lesson of Hundall: creditors should send notice to all parties to the transaction -- the principal debtors, guarantors and the owners of the collateral.

Monday, January 22, 2024

Foreclosure: Trustees in Foreclosure

Trustee under a deed of trust are agents for both the lender and the borrowers. Accordingly, a trustee must act fairly and impartially. The lender must not let either the lender or the borrower influence the manner in which a trustee carries out the terms of the deed of trust, especially if this would be detrimental to either party. If any question arises as to the existence of the default or the amount in default, a trustee should seek the aid and direction of the court. The powers and duties of a trustee are governed by the deed of trust and Virginia Code Section 55-59.1 et seq. The code provides when the deed of trust does not. A trustee has no right to exercise the power of sale or to obtain possession until such time as the borrower defaults under the note or deed of trust, and, then, only for the purpose of selling the property at foreclosure or preserving the property until sale. When a default occurs, there is no change in title – the property merely becomes eligible to be sold under the powers originally conferred to the trustee by the owner. Thus, the noteholder has the right to have the property sold and the proceeds of the sale applied to the debt.

Monday, January 15, 2024

Real Estate: The Virginia Property Owners’ Association Act – An Introduction

The Virginia Property Owners’ Association Act provides homeowner’s associations with additional protections when homeowners fail to pay their dues; it also defines responsibilities of the association. Accordingly, homeowner’s associations should be knowledgeable of the Act and its provisions. The Act applies to developments subject to a declaration recorded after January 1, 1959, associations incorporated or otherwise organized after such date, and all subdivisions created under the former Subdivided Land Sales Act. In the next issue of Creditor News, I will briefly introduce this Act and some of the special duties it imposes on homeowner’s associations.  Subsequent issues will address memorandum of liens and foreclosures.

Monday, January 8, 2024

Bankruptcy: Award of Attorneys Fees Against Creditors

A debtor sought to recover attorney's fees from a creditor who unsuccessfully challenged the debtor's dischargeability. The creditor had alleged that the items listed on the debtor's statement of financial affairs were materially false, but was unable to convince the Bankruptcy Court. The Bankruptcy Court, however, denied the debtor's request for attorney's fees because there was not evidence that the creditor pursued the complaint frivolously or without substantial justification. The case was In Re: Louise Reynolds Freeman, decided by Judge Tice for the United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia also held that debtor's counsel are not entitled to recover attorney's fees from a creditor where the creditor loses a suit objecting to debtor's discharge unless it is proven that the suit was filed vexatiously, wantonly, in bad faith, or for oppressive reasons in the case of In Re Gecowetts. In Gecowetts the debtor's estranged wife filed an action objecting to the debtor's dischargeability of a debt. After a full trial on this issue, the Court allowed the debtor a discharge of all debts. Relying on the "American Rule," the Court found that although the creditor was unsuccessful in the dischargeability proceeding, the action was not filed vexatiously, wantonly, in bad faith, or for oppressive reasons. Therefore, no fees were awarded.

Monday, January 1, 2024

Collections: Collection Accounts - What We Can Do For You

We can assist you by handling all seriously delinquent accounts from start to finish - no other collection alternative that you have can do this.

I also want to thank all of you who are clients. You helped make this year our most successful ever. I look forward to an ever better 2024.

For those of you who are not yet clients, please know that I am always ready and willing to meet with you. At Lafayette, Ayers & Whitlock, PLC, we have a diverse general practice of law. We focus on Creditor’s Rights. We are unique amongst Creditor’s Rights law firms as we represent you in all areas: collections, bankruptcy, foreclosure and real estate.

In collection matters, we can assist you by handling all seriously delinquent accounts from start to finish - no other collection alternative that you have can do this.

If you hire an additional staff employee, you are paying salary and benefits for collections. This amount is non-recoverable from your debtors, even though they caused the expenditure. Further, since the employee is not an attorney, they cannot try contested cases, or file Motions for Judgment in Circuit Court, or conduct debtor's interrogatories (without interrogatories many collection cases will sit inactive).

If you employ a collection agency, you may incur a flat fee cost for accounts. This cost is not recoverable under Virginia law, despite the fact that your loan documents say that the debtor will pay all costs of collection. In addition to these nonrecoverable costs, you will also have percentage costs that you cannot recover. A collection agency is frequently your worst option because they can do less for you than you can do for yourself. In reviewing the Collection Alternatives Comparison Charts, you will see that if a debtor does not respond to the collection agency's letters, the agency is sunk. The agency cannot file any court papers on your behalf, and they cannot perform any judgment executions. In the end, all a collection agency does is provide a threatening third party voice.

If you choose Lafayette, Ayers & Whitlock, PLC, we can handle your accounts from beginning to end. We can accept all cases on a one-third contingency fee of all amounts collected. We will assess the court-allowed fee the moment the account is turned over for collection, and this amount is recoverable from the debtor. We have trained and experienced support staff and an aggressive approach to collections. In reviewing the Course of Action Chart (below) you will see that we will aggressively pursue your recovery. Virginia District Court judgments are good for ten years, twenty in the Circuit Court. If the judgment is docketed (we docket all judgments unless the value is very small or you instruct otherwise), the lien is enforceable for twenty years. We provide detailed monthly accounting. At the beginning of each month you will receive a report outlining significant matters, a computer generated financial accounting, by debtor, dollar for dollar. You will also receive a case status report detailing current status and action.

In bankruptcy matters, we can assist you by handling all of your needs. We can review bankruptcy schedules, review and object to chapter 13 plans, file proofs of claim, attend hearings and more.

In foreclosure matters, we can assist you by handling all of your foreclosure cases from demand to final accounting in all counties and cities across the Commonwealth.

In real estate matters, we can assist you by preparing loan documents for first, second, equity line and refinances, as well as conducting closings, recordings and coordinating title examination and title insurance.

Please call me at 545-6251 for a free consultation.