Foreclosure: Deed in lieu of Foreclosure

     In certain cases it may be more practical for the lender to seek or accept from the borrower a deed in lieu of foreclosure rather than incur the expense of foreclosure – this is at the lender’s discretion. If the lender agrees, in return for voluntarily surrendering the property, the borrower will seek either partial or complete satisfaction of the debt.

     Considerations. Before accepting the deed in lieu of foreclosure, the lender must consider many matters:

     a. Value of the property vs. the amount of the debt.
     b. Other debts on the property. A deed in lieu of foreclosure does not extinguish prior or junior liens or encumbrances. Thus the lender, in accepting the deed, accepts the property with the liens. It is possible for the lender to structure the deed in lieu of foreclosure so that it does not release the deed of trust so as to preserve a future foreclosure to extinguish subordinate liens.

Real Estate: The Virginia Property Owners’ Association Act – Memorandums of Lien

     Previously I began discussing the Virginia Property Owners’ Association Act.

     The Act specifically provides for remedies outside of the more common remedy of filing suit for the amount owed and receiving a judgment. A memorandum of lien to a holder of a credit line deed of trust under the Act is given in the same fashion as if the association’s lien were a judgment. Under the Act, the association can file for and perfect a lien against the homeowner that is prior to all other subsequent liens and encumbrances except real estate tax liens, liens and encumbrances recorded prior to the recordation of the declaration, and sums unpaid on and owing under any mortgage or deed of trust recorded prior to perfection of this lien.

     To perfect the memorandum of lien, the association must file with the clerk of the circuit court in the county or city in which the development is situated a memorandum verified by the oath of the principal officer of the association or another officer provided for in the declaration. The memorandum must be filed within 12 months from the first assessment became due and payable. Additionally, prior to filing a memorandum of lien, a written notice must be sent to the property owner by certified mail, at the owner’s last known address, informing the owner that the lien will be filed in the circuit court clerk’s office at least 10 days before the actual filing date of the lien. The memorandum must name the development, describe the lot, name the person(s) constituting the owners of the lot, list the amount of unpaid assessments currently due or past due relative to such lot together with the date when each fell due, list the date of issuance of the memorandum, name the association with a name and address of the contact for the person to contact to arrange for payment or release of the lien, and state that the association is obtaining a lien in accordance with the provisions of the Virginia Property Owners’ Association act as set forth in Chapter 26 (section 55-508 et seq.) of Title 55.

     The Act provides that a judgment or decree in this action must include, without limitation, reimbursement for costs and reasonable attorney’s fees for the prevailing party. Also, if the association prevails, it may also recover interest at the legal rate for the sums secured by the lien from the time each sum became due and payable. If the owner then satisfies the debt, the lien must be released, and failure to release the lien results in a penalty.

     Once a lien has been perfected, the association must enforce the lien within 36 months from the time when the memorandum of lien was recorded. This time period cannot be extended.

     In a future blog post I will discuss foreclosure on a lien.

Bankruptcy: Dischargeability of Student Loans

     In recent posts I reviewed the first case examining the application of Bankruptcy Code §523(a)(8) concerning the dischargeability of student loans.

     The second case is Jones v. National Payment Center, which was heard by the United States Bankruptcy Court in Richmond. In Jones the Court held that the debtor had the ability to repay $13,000 of her $16,000 in student loans, and $3,000 was thus determined to be dischargeable in bankruptcy under Bankruptcy Code §523(a)(8)(b), because of the “undue hardship” arising from debtor’s medical condition of chronic fatigue. This was the Court’s second decision in this case - the first decision in favor of full discharge was overturned on the creditor’s appeal. In this remanded trial, the creditor argued that all of the debt was non-dischargeable. However, the Court allowed a partial discharge.

     The Court ruled that simply because the debtor earned a higher wage ($5 per hour more than at the time of the Court’s earlier opinion), and had a higher net income than she did when she first came before the Court, did not mean that she was not entitled to a partial hardship discharge. While it was true that she had over $700 left over each month after paying for necessary expenses, the Bankruptcy Court found that this was largely due to the fact that she was dependent at that time upon her parents. In considering whether a debtor could maintain a minimal standard of living based on current income and expenses, courts differ as to how they treat the fact that a debtor relies on parental support. The Court found that it would be inappropriate to treat all of the savings the debtor realized by living with her parents as available to pay her student loan debt. The debtor testified that she planned to move out of her parents’ home sometime in the coming year, at which time her expenses would increase drastically. More of her net income would be needed to maintain a minimal standard of living as her parents would no longer be providing her with shelter and transportation. The Court found that there was no reason not to consider these facts in the minimal standard of living calculus.

     The Court ruled that to hold the debtor’s student loan nondischargeable would penalize her for simply doing the best she could under the circumstances. The debtor’s parents were retired and on a fixed income and they could not support her indefinitely. It was therefore prudent for the debtor to build her savings and prepare for the day when she would no longer be able to live with her parents.

     The Bankruptcy Court allowed the debtor to continue building her savings so that she would become self-sufficient by discharging all but $13,000 of her student loans and giving her approximately six years to repay this amount with interest on the unpaid balance of 8.25 percent.

     The third case is Commonwealth of Va., State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Gibson. In Gibson the Court ruled that under Bankruptcy Code §523(a)(8)(A), a student loan is not dischargeable in bankruptcy unless the loan became due more than seven years (exclusive of any applicable suspension of the repayment period) before the date of the filing of the petition. Therefore, the seven-year nondischargeability period is calculated by determining the amount of time between the date the loan became due and the date the borrower filed bankruptcy, then subtracting the amount of time during which any "applicable suspension" periods were in effect.

     In Gibson the debtor filed her current Chapter 13, slightly more than seven years after the loan became due. However, during the debtor's previous Chapter 7 bankruptcy, an automatic stay was in effect and prevented the Commonwealth from taking any action to collect the student loan, and the debtor did not make any payments on the loan during the period. The Court held that the previous automatic stay was an "applicable suspension of the repayment period" that tolled the nondischargeability period. Accordingly, upon applying the formula listed above, the debtor did not have the equivalent of seven years payments on her loans, and therefore, the loans were not dischargeable.

Collections: Note Guarantee Upheld

     In the case of NationsBank v. Mahoney, the Fairfax County Circuit Court upheld a note and guarantee agreement, as well as the sale of collateral pursuant to the terms of these documents.

      The guarantor in Mahoney argued that the creditor acted in bad faith. The guarantor asked the Court to imply in the note and guarantee agreement additional terms from the commercial good faith provision of Virginia Code §8.1-203. The Court, however, found that the note and guarantee agreement's provisions were "within the preview of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in Virginia", and that each alleged act of bad faith was expressly authorized in the terms of the note and guarantee agreement. The Court ruled that it could not imply the terms requested because the result would be to negate or materially alter the explicit terms freely agreed upon by the parties.

     The lesson from Mahoney is that properly prepared notes are the key to collection should the loan become sour. Legal review of loan documents prior to execution can be more cost effective than legal representation after default.

Creditors, Let's Talk about Foreclosures!

     Foreclosures. This is not a topic that most creditors wish to discuss. After all, if you get to this point your loan is delinquent and you are not having success getting your borrower to pay. When to take action and what action to take – these are important matters to discuss. We can help!

     At Lafayette, Ayers & Whitlock PLC we represent holders of deeds of trust and help our clients evaluate their order of priority and equity cushion, as well as explore bankruptcy implications and collection strategies. We do this for first, second and subsequent deeds of trust, as well as equity lines and judgment liens (the last of which can be enforced through a Creditor’s Bill).

     We do foreclosures all across the Commonwealth of Virginia.

     Even if we are not your specified trustee in your deed of trust, we can prepare and record a deed of appointment of substitute trustee and protect your interests.

     I invite you to please call me so that we can discuss your questions.

Foreclosure: Right to Cure a Default

     Question: Once a borrower is in default, can he “reinstate the loan”, or, “cure the default” and stop the foreclosure sale? Answer: yes. In general, most deeds of trust contain language that allows a borrower the opportunity to reinstate, or cure, the loan after the due date set out in the note. If the deed of trust contains this language, the note cannot be placed into default and accelerated until the cure period has expired. Government loans such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have very specific requirements. In fact, a borrower can always cure a monetary default and stop a foreclosure up to the time of sale by paying in full, in good funds, the deficient amount, including all costs of the sale.

Real Estate: The Virginia Property Owners’ Association Act – General Provisions

     In September, I began a review of the Virginia Property Owners’ Act. Under the Act, sellers are required to disclose in their sales contract that the property is located within a development subject to the Act. The Act also requires the seller to retrieve the Disclosure Packet in the Act and provide it to the purchaser. The Disclosure Packet includes the following information: association documents, the name of the association, state of incorporation, register agent’s name and address, any other entity/facility to which the owner may owe fees or charges, budget or summary, income/expenses statement or balance sheet for last fiscal year, statement of balance due of outstanding loans, nature/status of pending lawsuits, unpaid judgments (with material impact on association or members or relating to lot being purchased), insurance coverage provided for lot owners including fidelity bond maintained by association, and much more

     The purchaser may cancel the contract within three days if delivered by hand or email, or six days if sent by mail, after receiving the Disclosure Packet or being notified that it is “not available” (meaning: a current annual report has not been filed by the Association with either the SCC or the CICB; or the seller has requested in writing that the packet be provided and it is not received within 14 days; or the association has provided written notice that the Disclosure Packet is not available). Additionally, if the Disclosure Packet is not delivered or the association does not indicate that it is not available, the purchaser may cancel the sale any time prior to closing. If the purchaser received the Disclosure Packet, the owner also has the right to request an update. However, the rights to receive and cancel the contract are waived conclusively if not exercised before settlement.

     Failure to provide a Disclosure Packet after a written request for it has been made results in a waiver of any claim to delinquent assessments or violations of association documents up to that point, and the association will be liable to the seller for actual damages sustained up to $1,000 if the association is managed by a CIC Manager or up to $500 if it is self-managed.

     In the next months, I will discuss the provisions of the Virginia Property Owners’ Association Act that provide a memorandum of lien and foreclosure in the event of an owner’s default.

Creditors, Let’s Talk about Bankruptcy!

     Bankruptcy! This is not a topic that most creditors wish to discuss! However, with Judges still “reacting” to the economic downturn of the last few years, with bankruptcy filings on the rise, with the conversion of many Chapter 13 cases to Chapter 7, with the aggressive lawsuits filed by counsel for debtors for violations of consumer laws, with increasingly detrimental provisions in Chapter 13 plans, and, with the strict review of proofs of claim and the requirements for the same, we should talk!

     In regard to proofs of claim, our local bankruptcy courts require that if you are alleging a security interest in the debtor’s principal residence, in addition to the proof of claim form, you must also file a completed form B 10 (Attachment A) setting out the principal due, interest due, late fees, returned check fees, attorney’s fees, escrow shortage, amount due to bring loan current, etc. In addition, each time the debtor becomes delinquent on their mortgage during the bankruptcy, you must file form B 10 (Supplement 2), setting out late charges and other expenses charged to the debt. In the event the debtor’s mortgage payment amount changes due to increase or decrease in interest rate, insurance premiums or real estate taxes, form B Supplement (1) will need to be filed.

    Obviously, this is a more complex and detailed filing, and, certainly, will be closely scrutinized. While you can file your own proofs of claim, we can also do it for you.

     Creditors must be very careful to fully redact ALL “identifying data” (this includes procedure codes and/or other identifying treatment references for healthcare providers) on court filings to help protect debtors’ vital information from identity theft. Failure to do so will result in a court award of sanctions and attorney’s fees. Several local bankruptcy attorneys are reviewing all proofs of claim in their cases to spot possible violations. I have already had clients who have filed their own proofs of claim and been sued for violations. This is a very expensive problem.

     Accordingly, I am still offering a “flat rate” fee for filing your proofs of claim and ask that you consider taking advantage of the same. In the end, I think that this will be a less costly and better alternative for you. I will file your first proof of claim in a case for a charge of one normal one hour billing rate ($250.00). Second and subsequent pleadings for the same case will be billed at one half hour, and one quarter hour respectively.

     I invite you to please call me so that we can discuss your questions.

Bankruptcy: Dischargeability of Student Loans

     Student loans generally are non-dischargeable debts and pass through the bankruptcy process unaffected. Congress has provided that government-guaranteed student loans are nondischargeable in bankruptcy unless the debtor can demonstrate that the repayment of such student loans would constitute an undue hardship under Bankruptcy Code 523(a)(8).  However, there are exceptions that allow for dischargeability.  In this blog and a December blog, I will review three cases to examine the application of Bankruptcy Code §523(a)(8) concerning the dischargeability of student loans.

      The first case is Murphy v. CEO/Manager, Sallie Mae, heard by the United States Bankruptcy Court at Norfolk, Virginia.  In Murphy the court found as fact that the debtor’s nine year old daughter was permanently disabled, as she suffered from Pfeiffer syndrome.  This disability caused the debtor to discontinue her medical education.  It also impeded the debtor’s ability to work.  The loans in question totaled $58,000.00, on which no payments were ever made.  However, the debtor’s husband earned $82,000.00 annually.  Further, the debtor’s evidence illustrated a monthly family disposable income of $400.00.  The debtor argued that the family’s net disposable income was not available to repay her student loans because she and her husband had a savings account in the event that he was laid off.  At the time of the bankruptcy, the account had $2,500.00.  The court further noted that based upon the debtor’s testimony that her son was changing from private school to public school, it was logical to presume that there was an additional $507.00 per month available from the savings in private school tuition plus an extra $109.00 per month paid on an automobile that would be available for student loans.  Eliminating these household expenses and adding these to the $400.00 already noted as per month disposable net income to pay toward the student loan debt.

     The Court stated that it was doubtless that the debtor’s burden of caring for her disabled child was immeasurable, and her disappointment in her inability to complete her medical education immense. However, discharge of a student loan must be founded on more than notions of fairness or sympathy. Because of the debtor’s husband’s successful employment, the debtor and her dependents enjoyed an income well in excess of nearly all who seek undue hardship discharge, and a substantially more comfortable lifestyle than the minimal one contemplated by the criteria for a hardship discharge. Accordingly, the court found that the student loans were non-dischargeable, and thus denied the debtor’s motion to discharge her student loans due to hardship under Bankruptcy Code §523(a)(8).

Collections: Parties Liable for Credit Card Debts

  The Richmond Circuit Court, in the case of Chevy Chase Savings Bank v. Strong, ruled that a husband who was only an “authorized user” on a bank credit card issued to his wife was not liable to the bank for a $5,024 cash advance check he wrote on the credit card; only the wife was liable.

     In Virginia Code §11-31, Virginia has codified the rule that use by an authorized agent of a cardholder shall be the equivalent of use by the cardholder.  That rule, however, does not address the question of the liability of the agent.  The court reasoned that while it does not appear that any Virginia Court has addressed the issue, the language used in the statute and case law from other jurisdictions led the Court to believe that the issue was governed by agency law.

     The Court stated that it was well established in Virginia that when an agent contracts for a disclosed principal, credit is extended to the principal, and the benefits of the contract are accepted by the principal, there is no personal liability on the agent. In this case, the bank was well aware that the principal was the wife. It extended credit to her based on her application for a card. They were aware that no contract was ever made with husband individually and, therefore, they knew that he was simply an authorized agent.
   
     The Court found that there was no indication in this case that husband exceeded his authority in executing the check against the account, or that he agreed to be personally liable for any debt incurred on his wife’s account. Accordingly, the court ruled that the liability for the debts belonged only to wife. The court ruled that the husband was not liable for any portion of the outstanding balance, including the amount of the check that he personally wrote.

     The lesson from Strong - do not confuse guarantors with authorized users.

LAW Business work

     Many of you have inquired about my availability to do business work and attend corporate, credit union, and homeowner’s association meetings. I do this, and, I am available.

     When it comes to board work, I recognize that most board members are volunteers. Having experienced counsel available to provide advice, guidance and continuity as boards change is crucial for productive and efficient boards, as well as for avoiding potential board member liability in lawsuits.

     

     When it comes to larger meetings (stockholders, credit union members, or homeowner’s associations), having experienced counsel available to explain rights and options, as well as analyze courses of action and provide advice can be invaluable.

     If you think that you may have a need, please call me so that we can discuss. I can structure a reasonable rate to fit your needs.

Foreclosure: Default

Question: When is a loan in default? Answer: Under one or more of several circumstances. The most common way that a borrower is in default is monetary – e.g., the borrower fails to make a required payment. However, default can be for a non-monetary reason as well, such as:

1. Failure to pay taxes.

2. Failure to pay insurance.

3. Failure to remove or bond over mechanic’s liens.

4. Failure to perform requirements unique to the loan.

LAW Real Estate Matters

     Many of you have recently asked if I handle real estate work. The answer is YES! I do residential and commercial transactions – especially for Credit Unions. I handle first and second loans, as well as refinances, equity lines of credit, and foreclosures. I have two very experienced real estate paralegals (Donna Dunn and Sandra Milburn), who have been working in the real estate field for many years.

     Unlike other attorneys and real estate settlement companies, I will always provide you with the real cost of your transaction in advance, not have “hidden costs” with different names buried in the settlement statement.

     I invite you to please call me so that we can discuss your real estate needs.

Real Estate: The Virginia Property Owners’ Association Act – An Introduction

     The Virginia Property Owners’ Association Act provides homeowner’s associations with additional protections when homeowners fail to pay their dues; it also defines responsibilities of the association. Accordingly, homeowner’s associations should be knowledgeable of the Act and its provisions. The Act applies to developments subject to a declaration recorded after January 1, 1959, associations incorporated or otherwise organized after such date, and all subdivisions created under the former Subdivided Land Sales Act. In the November, I will briefly introduce this Act and some of the special duties it imposes on homeowner’s associations. In December, I will address memorandum of liens and foreclosures.

Creditors, Let's Talk about Post Judgment Collections

     Post Judgment Collections. Frequently this is the time that you will collect most of your money.

     While at Lafayette, Ayers & Whitlock PLC we represent creditors from beginning to end in the collection process, we recognize that some creditors either still file some of their own suits, or, have done so in the past. After taking that judgment, and if collection does not come easy, all too frequently judgments are “put on the shelf” and eventually forgotten. Do not let this happen to you! At Lafayette, Ayers & Whitlock PLC we can help you collect judgments that you have already taken. Your General District Court judgments are good for ten years, but can be docketed in a Circuit Court to extend the life of the judgment to twenty years. These judgments can even be renewed for an additional twenty years. We can work your old judgments. We have the most up-to-date programs, resources and methods. We do all of this on a percentage of collections fee basis – in other words, if we do not collect, you do not pay us a fee. Accordingly, our incentive is to collect! I take pride in the fact that at Lafayette, Ayers & Whitlock PLC our experience, staff, responsiveness and resources have made our post judgment collections superior to other collectors.

     I invite you to please call me so that we can discuss your questions.

Bankruptcy: Redemption - Exercising the Right of Redemption

     Can debtors exercise the right of redemption after discharge has been ordered?
     A decision by Judge Krumm for the Western District of Virginia appears to have answered this question. The case was In Re Hawkins. The debtors sought to reaffirm the bank loan secured by their Dodge Colt. The debtors later learned of Bankruptcy Code §722 redemption rights, and sought to redeem instead of reaffirm. Before redemption was achieved, the chapter 7 discharge was granted. The creditor opposed the motion and alleged that debtors' right of redemption expired when they were discharged in bankruptcy. The court found for the debtors and held that the debtors' discharge did not bar their motion for redemption under § 722. Debtors were clearly entitled to reaffirm debts after discharge under 11 U.S.C.S. § 524. While 11 U.S.C.S. § 722 was silent on whether they were allowed to redeem property after discharge, the court found that it was Congress' intent to consider the concepts of reaffirmation and redemption together. The court reasoned that although the Code is silent as to when debtors may exercise their right to redeem, since concepts from reaffirmation and redemption were considered by Congress together, the time frame for exercising one option should be applicable to the other option. Therefore, the time frame for exercising redemption rights was the same as that for exercising reaffirmation rights.
     Right to redeem / repossess property in Chapter 13 cases:
     In the case of Tidewater Finance Co. v. Moffett, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a Chapter 13 debtor was entitled to the return of her car, which had been repossessed by a finance company. This decision affirmed the original bankruptcy court decision, as well as the appellate decision of the District Court.
     In Moffett, the debtor, in her reorganization plan, exercised her right to redeem under the Virginia Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”); the plan provided for full payment of her debt to the finance company, plus interest on the delinquent payments.
     The debtor worked at the Federal Emergency Management Agency, forty miles from her home. A couple of years prior to the bankruptcy filing she had bought a previously owned, three year old Honda Accord from a dealer in Woodbridge, which assigned its loan to the finance company creditor. The car was the debtor’s only means to get to work each day. The debtor made her payments in a timely fashion for a year, and then missed two payments. This prompted the finance company to repossess the car. Later that same day the debtor filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. A week after that the debtor’s lawyer demanded that the finance company return the car. The finance company filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay so that it could sell the vehicle. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, however, and ordered the finance company to return the car. In doing so, the bankruptcy judge required adequate protection for the creditor in the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan. The debtor’s Chapter 13 plan provided for full payment of the loan. The finance company returned the car, but appealed to the District Court.
     The District Court Judge found that the debtor had a statutory right of redemption, and also found that the finance company was required to turn over the car once its interest was adequately protected in the Chapter 13 plan.
     The finance company appealed again, this time to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. In his opinion, the Fourth Circuit Court Judge cited that pursuant to the federal bankruptcy code, once a petition is filed, an automatic stay goes in effect. Any party with property that the trustee can use, sell or lease must turn it over to the trustee, after that party’s interest is protected. The district judge said the question in this case was whether the finance company and the car at issue were subject to the referenced code provisions. The judge looked at the UCC as controlling, since the case involved default on a purchase agreement with a secured creditor. The UCC allows the creditor the right of repossession, but within limits. The debtor also has rights upon repossession, including the right to redeem the property under UCC Section 8.9A-623 (c)(2). The Judge ruled that the debtor’s right to redemption becomes one of the “legal or equitable interests” of her bankruptcy estate.
     The 4th Circuit agreed with the lower courts that if the creditor’s interest is protected in the plan, then it must turn over the car. UCC Section 8.9-623(b) allows a debtor to redeem collateral by tendering in full its obligations to the creditor. In this case, the Judge noted that the debtor’s plan did just that. The plan even provided interest to the finance company for the delinquent payments. The Judge wrote: “[T]he bankruptcy plan here provided for the payment of all future installments, the curing of all delinquent payments, and the payment of all applicable interest over the course of the plan”. “Such a flexible approach to repaying claims is precisely what the Bankruptcy Code allows in order to facilitate a debtor’s successful rehabilitation.” The Judge affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Collection: Fraudulent Conversion or Removal of Property Subject to Lien or Title

     The Richmond Circuit Court case of Va. Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Brooks & Co. Gen Contractors Inc. serves as a good example of judicial recognition of the rights of judgment creditors in arbitration proceedings.
     In Va. Builders, the creditor, a building supply company, issued a garnishment summons upon a general contractor for sums due from the general contractor to the judgment debtor, a subcontractor. The contracts between the contractor and the subcontractor, under which the judgment creditor sought to garnish the sums due the subcontractor, included clauses for mandatory arbitration. The garnishee sought arbitration after being served with the garnishment. The garnishee refused to allow the judgment creditor to participate. The garnishee received a garnishment award indicating that it owed the subcontractor no sums. The garnishee answered the garnishment that no sums were due. The Richmond General District Court agreed. The Richmond Circuit Court disagreed, and sent the case back for further review. The Richmond Circuit Court reasoned that the garnishee should not be able to affect the potential funds due the judgment creditor while prohibiting the judgment creditor from participating in the proceedings.

Foreclosure: Substitute Trustees

     Question: What happens if the trustee under your deed of trust is either unavailable, or, is no longer the person you desire to serve as trustee? Answer: You can appoint a substitute trustee. Under Virginia Code Section 55-59(9), the noteholder, or, the holders of greater than fifty percent of the monetary obligation secured by the deed of trust, have the right and the power to appoint a substitute trustee or trustees for any reason, regardless of whether such right is expressly granted in the deed of trust. The timing of your action is important. The trustee must be empowered before taking action – this occurs when the instrument of appointment has been executed. You do not have to wait for recording. However, as Virginia Code Section 55-59(9) states that the appointment of a substitute trustee shall be recorded before, or at the time of, the recording of the deed conveying the property (such as after a foreclosure).
     Question: Can a lender appoint their counsel as trustee? Answer: Yes. Virginia Code Section 26-58 holds that a trustee is not disqualified merely because he is a stockholder, member, employee, officer or director or counsel to the lender.

Bankruptcy: Redemption - Exercising the Right of Redemption

Can debtors exercise the right of redemption after discharge has been ordered?

     A decision by Judge Krumm for the Western District of Virginia appears to have answered this question. The case was In Re Hawkins. The debtors sought to reaffirm the bank loan secured by their Dodge Colt. The debtors later learned of Bankruptcy Code §722 redemption rights, and sought to redeem instead of reaffirm. Before redemption was achieved, the chapter 7 discharge was granted.  The creditor opposed the motion and alleged that debtors' right of redemption expired when they were discharged in bankruptcy. The court found for the debtors and held that the debtors' discharge did not bar their motion for redemption under § 722. Debtors were clearly entitled to reaffirm debts after discharge under 11 U.S.C.S. § 524. While 11 U.S.C.S. § 722 was silent on whether they were allowed to redeem property after discharge, the court found that it was Congress' intent to consider the concepts of reaffirmation and redemption together. The court reasoned that although the Code is silent as to when debtors may exercise their right to redeem, since concepts from reaffirmation and redemption were considered by Congress together, the time frame for exercising one option should be applicable to the other option. Therefore, the time frame for exercising redemption rights was the same as that for exercising reaffirmation rights.

      Right to redeem / repossess property in Chapter 13 cases:

      In the case of Tidewater Finance Co. v. Moffett, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a Chapter 13 debtor was entitled to the return of her car, which had been repossessed by a finance company.  This decision affirmed the original bankruptcy court decision, as well as the appellate decision of the District Court.

     In Moffett, the debtor, in her reorganization plan, exercised her right to redeem under the Virginia Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”); the plan provided for full payment of her debt to the finance company, plus interest on the delinquent payments.

     The debtor worked at the Federal Emergency Management Agency, forty miles from her home.  A couple of years prior to the bankruptcy filing she had bought a previously owned, three year old Honda Accord from a dealer in Woodbridge, which assigned its loan to the finance company creditor.  The car was the debtor’s only means to get to work each day.  The debtor made her payments in a timely fashion for a year, and then missed two payments.  This prompted the finance company to repossess the car.  Later that same day the debtor filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy.  A week after that the debtor’s lawyer demanded that the finance company return the car.  The finance company filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay so that it could sell the vehicle.  The bankruptcy court denied the motion, however, and ordered the finance company to return the car.  In doing so, the bankruptcy judge required adequate protection for the creditor in the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan.  The debtor’s Chapter 13 plan provided for full payment of the loan.  The finance company returned the car, but appealed to the District Court.

     The District Court Judge found that the debtor had a statutory right of redemption, and also found that the finance company was required to turn over the car once its interest was adequately protected in the Chapter 13 plan.

     The finance company appealed again, this time to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. In his opinion, the Fourth Circuit Court Judge cited that pursuant to the federal bankruptcy code, once a petition is filed, an automatic stay goes in effect. Any party with property that the trustee can use, sell or lease must turn it over to the trustee, after that party’s interest is protected. The district judge said the question in this case was whether the finance company and the car at issue were subject to the referenced code provisions. The judge looked at the UCC as controlling, since the case involved default on a purchase agreement with a secured creditor. The UCC allows the creditor the right of repossession, but within limits. The debtor also has rights upon repossession, including the right to redeem the property under UCC Section 8.9A-623 (c)(2). The Judge ruled that the debtor’s right to redemption becomes one of the “legal or equitable interests” of her bankruptcy estate.

     The 4th Circuit agreed with the lower courts that if the creditor’s interest is protected in the plan, then it must turn over the car. UCC Section 8.9-623(b) allows a debtor to redeem collateral by tendering in full its obligations to the creditor. In this case, the Judge noted that the debtor’s plan did just that. The plan even provided interest to the finance company for the delinquent payments. The Judge wrote: “[T]he bankruptcy plan here provided for the payment of all future installments, the curing of all delinquent payments, and the payment of all applicable interest over the course of the plan”. “Such a flexible approach to repaying claims is precisely what the Bankruptcy Code allows in order to facilitate a debtor’s successful rehabilitation.” The Judge affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Real Estate: Homeowners' Association Wins Damages on Owner Violations

     There has been much litigation over HOA violations in the last few years. Circuit Courts have been scrutinizing HOA violation claims very carefully. Enforcement and damages for violations can be won. The December 2011 Loudon County Circuit Court case of Lee’s Crossing Homeowners’ Association v. Zinone is a good example of such enforcement. In Lee’s Crossing, the court found that in building her home, the homeowner committed multiple violations of the plan approved by the Architectural Review Board. Ultimately, the court assessed damages in favor of the homeowners’ association on the basis of “one overriding violation,” the failure to comply with the ARB-approved application.

Bankruptcy: Redemption - An Introduction

     In this and future blogs I will explore Redemption.
     In general. Bankruptcy Code §722 provides debtors with the right to redeem property. The redemption option is being exercised more often (as opposed to reaffirmation) because collateral loan balances are frequently much greater than the value of the underlying collateral, and, because redemption financing options are growing. The code states:
     [a]n individual debtor may, whether or not the debtor has waived the right to redeem under this section, redeem tangible personal property intended primarily for personal, family, or household use, from a lien securing a dischargeable consumer debt, if such property is exempt under section 522 of this title or had been abandoned under section 554 of this title, by paying the holder of such lien the amount of the allowed secured claim of such holder that is secured by such lien in full at the time of redemption.
     Financing options. In the past redemption has been rare, as what debtor in bankruptcy has the ability to raise money for a lump sum purchase price, and what lender would make such a loan? There is, however, an option available for debtors, and debtor attorneys are aware of it. The option is to borrow the redemption price from “specialized” lenders, such as the company called “722 Redemption Funding, Inc.” This company is based in Cincinnati, Ohio. The company has been in business for a number of years and has expanded into other states - Virginia is one of them. Once the loan is made, this company takes a non-purchase money security interest in the vehicle and has first priority since the debtor has redeemed from (and therefore extinguished) the lien if the prior lender. To add insult to injury, this company uses another Cincinnati company (Collateral Valuation Services, L.L.C.) to prepare a vehicle condition report in an effort to determine the lowest possible value for the vehicle. If you have yet to see redemption by this method, I am sure that you will see one soon.
     How do you value the collateral? This is a good question that does not always have a clear answer. To make it complicated, the method for determining redemption value differs in Chapters 7 and 13.
     To determine collateral value in Chapter 7 cases, the case law is clear that the retail value should be used. The law is not so clear, however, in Chapter 13 cases. In 2004 I tried two cases before Judge Tice in the United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Virginia, involving this very issue. The debtors’ attorneys filed motions for redemption proposing to pay the trade-in value rather than the retail value. I objected to the motions, arguing that they were not proposed in good faith based upon these proposed values, and, that the creditors would be irreparably harmed. In doing the legal research it became clear that there was no preexisting Virginia decision controlling the decision, and that different states were taking different positions – some states use the wholesale value, some use the retail value, and, some use something other value determined by either an average of the two or utilizing other factors, such as the expected return to the creditor from a disposal of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. Of course I argued that it is unfair to place the entire burden and the risk of loss on the creditor, especially since it was the debtor who was in default! Ultimately, Judge Tice, having reviewed all of the tests applied across the country, wrote a detailed opinion. Judge Tice ruled that debtors should not be forced to redeem at retail valuation because the purpose of Bankruptcy Code §722 is to allow debtors to avoid having to pay the cost for replacing a vehicle. He ruled that a close approximation to the wholesale or liquidation value would be fair to creditors given the fact that creditors will save the cost of repossession and resale – that the redemption value should resemble an amount which the secured creditor would expect to recover upon the repossession and reasonable commercial disposition of the property.
      Since these decisions, the law has not become clearer. Judge Tice was presented with a similar issue in In re Hutchinson, where the court found that the fair redemption value was to be determined after considering the varying appraisals submitted. The court did not choose the trade in appraisal or the retail appraisal, but stated that debtors should not have been forced to redeem their car at a retail valuation (replacement value) of the property. Further, a close approximation to the wholesale or liquidation value was fair to the creditor in light of the fact that the repossession and resale costs would not have been incurred in light of the redemption. The court held that the redemption value should resemble an amount which the secured creditor would expect to recover upon repossession and reasonable commercial disposition of the property. The fair redemption value ultimately was determined to be a value between the trade in appraisal and the retail appraisal.

Collection: Attacking Fraudulent Conveyances

     It seems to happen more and more often. You are able to obtain your judgment against your debtor, but when you go to collect, he has recently transferred his assets. Can you pursue the assets to the transferee? Under the right circumstances, yes.
     The case of Price v. Hawkins, from the Newport News Circuit Court, appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court, stands for the position that a court may enter personal judgments against a transferee to provide a creditor with a remedy when, due to fraud, there is no other remedy.
     In Price the Court found that the debtor, a father, enlisted the help of his son and his son's girlfriend in the debtor's scheme to defraud his creditors. Specifically, the son and his girlfriend, who were not legitimate creditors of the debtor, assisted the debtor in hiding assets ($14,058.77) that the creditor would have otherwise reached in his judgment collection efforts. The transfers occurred after the judgment order was entered, and $10,000.00 was transferred to the son and the girlfriend three months later while the creditor was attempting to collect on the judgment.
     The Court found that simply declaring the fraudulent transfer "void" pursuant to Virginia Code §55-80 would be meaningless, as the conveyance was of money. In cases involving the fraudulent conveyance of real estate, title to the real estate is restored by a declaration, thus, subjecting the property to a creditor's bill. The Court ruled in Price that unless the money was delivered to the Court for the creditor to attach, then personal judgments were the only remedy.
     Perhaps the lesson of Price is: Ask questions! When your debtor is under oath for interrogatories, ask what assets have been conveyed to whom, when, and for what consideration.

Foreclosure: Trustees in Foreclosure

     Trustee under a deed of trust are agents for both the lender and the borrowers. Accordingly, a trustee must act fairly and impartially. The lender must not let either the lender or the borrower influence the manner in which a trustee carries out the terms of the deed of trust, especially if this would be detrimental to either party. If any question arises as to the existence of the default or the amount in default, a trustee should seek the aid and direction of the court. The powers and duties of a trustee are governed by the deed of trust and Virginia Code Section 55-59.1 et seq. The code provides when the deed of trust does not. A trustee has no right to exercise the power of sale or to obtain possession until such time as the borrower defaults under the note or deed of trust, and, then, only for the purpose of selling the property at foreclosure or preserving the property until sale. When a default occurs, there is no change in title – the property merely becomes eligible to be sold under the powers originally conferred to the trustee by the owner. Thus, the noteholder has the right to have the property sold and the proceeds of the sale applied to the debt.

Real Estate: Using Homeowner Association Liens to Secure an Interest in Real Estate

     In recent blogs we have been discussing the benefits of using real estate to improve creditors’ positions. As I have emphasized, properly securing debts through real estate could make the difference between collecting the funds and incurring a loss. In this blog, we will review the benefits of using homeowner association liens to aid in the collection of your debt.
     Virginia Code §55-516 provides for special procedures for the collection of homeowners association dues. This code section allows associations to place a lien on the land for unpaid assessments, as well as give associations a priority over certain other debts. To perfect the lien, however, it must be filed before the expiration of twelve months from the time the first such assessment became due and payable. This filing must be by a memorandum filed in the circuit court of the county or city where the development is located. The memorandum must contain the information specified in the statute. Before filing the lien, written notice must be sent to the property owner by certified mail giving at least ten days prior notice that a lien will be filed. Suit to foreclose on the lien must be brought within thirty six months of filing. We will review foreclosure suit procedures in a future blog.
     We have experienced attorneys and staff who can examine title, file homeowner association liens, and litigate to enforce the same.

Real Estate: Using Real Estate as a Collection Tool

     Collecting money owed can be a job. Having more tools to do the work is good! Securing your debt with real estate is a great tool. Each month in Creditor News (review Creditor News at www.lawplc.com) we will explore ways that use this tool. Articles will include such topics as: Deeds of Trust, Foreclosure, Docketing Judgments, Lis Pendens, Recording Mechanic’s Liens, Suits to Enforce Mechanic’s Liens, Foreclosing on Mechanic’s Liens, Recording Homeowners Association Liens, Foreclosing on Homeowners Association Liens and more.
     We have experienced attorneys and staff who can examine title, do real estate closings, seek judgment and docket and enforce the same, and prepare and enforce statutory liens, such as those for litigation, homeowner’s associations and mechanic lien situations. Please call me so that we can discuss how we can help you.

Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Petition - Substantial Abuse

     The United States Bankruptcy Court at Harrisonburg, Virginia, in the case of In Re: Rodriguez, dismissed a debtor’s Chapter 7 petition for “substantial abuse” pursuant to Bankruptcy Code §707(b) where the debtor’s voluntary monthly contribution of $286 to his 401(k), as well as his post-petition purchase of a Ford pickup truck, clearly indicated that the had the ability to fully fund a Chapter 13 plan without incurring undue hardship.
     The Bankruptcy Court found that the debtors’ post-petition purchase of the new truck resulted in a net increase in monthly transportation-related expenses of $220. This voluntary increase indicated that the debtor felt that he had the ability to pay at least that amount to his creditors. The increase in transportation-related expenses and the contribution to the 401(k) alone total over $500 per month that the debtor could have used to pay his creditors. In doing so, the debtor could have paid his creditors 100 percent in less than 10 months. Conversely, if the debtor remained in Chapter 7, the majority of his creditors would receive nothing.
     The debtor’s Schedule I indicated that he enjoyed steady employment with the same employer for eight years, and expected to earn $38,000 in that current year. Nothing in the other schedules filed with the debtor’s petition indicated a sudden illness or calamity which might have necessitated filing for Chapter 7 protection.
     The Bankruptcy Court found that the debtor’s post-petition truck purchase, made with the knowledge that a short-term 100 percent Chapter 13 plan was feasible, constituted the kind of egregious abuse that Bankruptcy Code §707(b) was intended to prevent.
     The lesson of Rodriguez - review Chapter 7 schedules for the ability to pay.

Collection: Bank Loses Without Aggressive Action

     The need for aggressive action was again proven when a bank lost a priority in assets due to the bank's non-action.
     In the case of First Union National Bank of Virginia v Craun, a federal court found that the bank obtained a consent judgment from the debtor (a limited partner in a Virginia limited partnership), but took no further action. A year later the limited partnership perfected a security interest in the debtor's partnership interest by filing a financing statement with the State Corporation Commission. The partnership's security interest was to perfect a loan by the debtor from the partnership.
     Eventually a dispute arose on the priority of liens on the proceeds between the bank, based on its judgment, and the partnership, based on its perfected assignment.
     The partnership had priority, the court ruled, because the bank had not sought to enforce the judgment or levy on the limited partner before the assignment was perfected. The Court stated:
 "… had a writ of execution issued, and had such a writ been delivered into the hands of the marshal, defendant's inchoate intangible rights in distributions from the limited partnerships could have subjected to the lien of the writ....Plaintiff could then argue the writ of execution would have taken priority over a security interest perfected after the writ was issued and placed in the hands of the serving official, assuming the secured lienor was provided notice of the issuance of execution...But, that is not the case here. Plaintiff did not cause a writ of execution to issue. Instead, it merely sought the entry of a charging order armed only with what may be best described as a "naked" final judgment...Therefore, until a charging order entered, the judgment debtor...virtually was free, as against the instant plaintiff, to encumber intangible property, including interests to discretionary distributions of a limited partnership."
     The lesson of Craun is simple - take aggressive action and consult with counsel early in the process.

Foreclosure: Deed of Trust

     It all starts with the deed of trust. The deed of trust is the primary method of acquiring a lien against real estate in Virginia. With a deed of trust, the owner of the real estate conveys legal title to a trustee, in trust, to secure the noteholder’s indebtedness. A deed of trust establishes a lien on the subject real estate upon execution by the grantor and recordation in the land records of the Circuit Court for the jurisdiction (County or City) in which the property is located. While recording the deed of trust is not essential to the validity of the deed of trust between the parties, an unrecorded deed of trust does not establish a lien on the subject real estate as to other creditors and purchasers of the grantor. An unrecorded deed of trust will not provide the beneficiary of the deed of trust with a priority position against other creditors with recorded liens, even if they are subsequent in time.

Real Estate: Docketing Judgments to Secure an Interest in Real Estate

     In previous editions of Creditor News (which you can find at www.lawplc.com) we have been discussing the benefits of using real estate to improve creditors’ positions. As I have emphasized, properly securing debts through real estate could make the difference between collecting the funds and incurring a loss. In this blog, we will review the benefits of docketing judgments to aid in the collection of your debt.
     Docketed judgments create a lien against the debtor’s real estate in the county or city in which the lien is docketed. Accordingly, make sure that you know where your debtor owns, or may own (e.g., through future purchase or inheritance), real estate. Once recorded, the lien will take priority in line with the date of recording (with some limited exceptions). Depending upon your debtor’s problems, you may have equity to cover your lien. Obviously you will want to “get in line” sooner rather than later to give you the best chance of collection.
     Once a lien is in place, it must be addressed at any sale or refinance of the real estate. The lien must also be addressed in bankruptcy -- if the debtor does not file a motion to strip the lien, the lien will survive a bankruptcy discharge.
     If all other collection measures are unsuccessful, you can consider bringing a creditor’s bill, which is an action to force the sale of real estate to satisfy a judgment under Virginia Code §8.01-462:
     Jurisdiction to enforce the lien of a judgment shall be in equity. If it appears to the court that the rents and profits of all real estate subject to the lien will not satisfy the judgment in five years, the court may decree such real estate, any part thereof, to be sold, and the proceeds applied to the discharge of the judgment.
     Although creditor’s bills may be costly, given the right judgment it is an effective collection tool. Determining what judgments are "right" requires experience and good judgment.
    We have experienced attorneys and staff who can seek judgment and then docket and enforce the same.
    

Bankruptcy: An Examination of the Dischargeability of Debts Regarding Property Damage-Malice

     In the last issues of Creditor News I began a multi-issue review of cases that address the dischargeability of debts regarding property damage-malice. The relevant bankruptcy code provision is §523(a)(6). I briefly established the standard used by courts to determine dischargeability of debts involving property damage and discussed how the court applied the standard to two cases involving rented property and withheld payments.
     In the case of Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Rose, the United States Bankruptcy Court at Big Stone Gap, Virginia, denied a creditor's motion to declare a debt nondischargeable as a malicious injury based upon withholding payments.
     In Rose, a Ford automobile dealership deliberately withheld payments to the creditor, a credit company, in order for the debtor to cover the dealership's operating expenses.
     The Court held that the critical determination is whether the debtor's actions satisfy the "maliciousness" requirement of Bankruptcy Code §523(a)(6). The leading case in the 4th Circuit on the maliciousness requirement is Vaughn, in which the Court used an objective test for determining "maliciousness", but did not clearly define the limits of that test.
     The Court ruled that both parties acknowledged that the debtor sold twenty-five vehicles, with a value of approximately $240,000, and failed to submit the proceeds to Ford Credit pursuant to the financing agreement. This was deliberate and intentional and so the willfulness requirement of the Bankruptcy Code §523(a)(6) was met. The Court found that the creditor failed to establish that the debtor was malicious, however.
     While it was undisputed that the debtor knew that he was breaching the financing agreement, it was not clear that his actions would necessarily be expected to cause harm. The debtor asserted that the dealership had more than enough assets to adequately secure Ford Credit when he used the unremitted funds in violation of the financing agreement. The debtor was only acting to keep the business afloat and applied all of the funds to that purpose, even forsaking any salary for ten months. Further, the debtor appeared to have given total cooperation to the liquidation effort and did not personally benefit from any of the money belonging to Ford Credit. Therefore, the Court denied the creditor's motion based upon its failure to prove maliciousness.
     As seen in the cases reviewed over the past few issues, property damage cases may appear simple, but they are not. Creditors frequently have the burden of proof, and, elements unproven can lose a case. Experienced counsel is needed.

     Please review past issues of Creditor News on our website at www.lawplc.com.

Collections: Promissory Note - Acceleration of Balance

     The case of Atlas Rooter Co. v Atlas Enterprise, Inc., decided by the City of Richmond Circuit Court, serves as an excellent review of creditor's acceleration rights upon late payment on a promissory note.
     In Atlas the undisputed facts were that the debtors mailed their loan payment within the ten-day grace period provided for in the promissory note (as they routinely did), but the payment was received after the ten-day grace period. The creditor moved to accelerate the balance due on the note. The debtors argued that the usual course of dealing between the parties authorized the use of the mail for payment. The debtors claimed that because payment by mail was permitted in the past, payment was made when the letter containing the payment was deposited in the mail, and that the risk of late payment was assumed by the note holders. The note, however, did not specify this.
     The Court ruled that under Virginia law, payment of a debt is made upon receipt by the creditor, rather than by mailing by the debtor. The Court further reasoned that Virginia Code §8.3A - 602 provides that tender of payment of a negotiable instrument must be made "to a person" entitled to enforce the instrument. Payment or satisfaction discharges the liability of a party only if made to the holder of the instrument. The Court stated that to allow the mailing of an installment as timely payment would act to qualify the U.S. Postal Service as an agent of the note holder.
     There is a lesson for creditors in Atlas even though the creditor prevailed. Keep detailed records of payments, do not waive payment due dates, and create a "paper trail" regarding late payment reminders. Creditors prevail best when they do not have to pay the cost for enforcing their rights.

Foreclosure: Foreclosure Basics

     Foreclosure law is a creature of state statute. Accordingly, each state’s laws are different. Because the statute controls, courts will enforce strict adherence to the exact words and requirements. Failing to fully comply with statutory mandates will likely result in defective foreclosures and costly work.
     In upcoming issues of Creditor News we will explore foreclosures from beginning to end. From the preparation of the deed of trust, to final accounting after sale.

     Please visit our website at www.lawplc.com to view copies of Creditor News.

Real Estate: Homeowner Associations - Damages Caused by Common Area Tree

     Townes at Grand Oaks Townhouse Association, Inc. v. Baxter is a recent case from Richmond Circuit Court that illustrates the importance of carefully drafted HOA agreements. The HOA sought to recover expenses for removing a tree that fell from a common area onto a homeowner’s condo. The Richmond Circuit Court held that the HOA agreement did not exempt the HOA from paying removal costs because a portion of the tree remained on the common area. The court noted that there was no Virginia authority for these facts, but stated that the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that in cases of fallen trees between adjoining properties in the absence of negligence, there is no liability for property damages on the landowner from where the tree fell. However, the HOA agreement is a contract that created the obligation for the HOA. The agreement had a provision requiring the HOA to maintain and replace trees, and another provision exempting the HOA from liability to an owner for repairing or replacing any portion of the lot or the improvements provided the homeowner has insurance as required by the agreement. The HOA relied on the first provision, but the court determined that that reliance was misplaced as it did not cover this situation. The HOA relied on the second provision because the homeowner did not have the required insurance for “the structure of each lot”, but only insurance for the inside of the home. However, the court heard evidence from the homeowner that he understood the language to only require internal insurance. The court noted three primary reasons for holding for the homeowner:
     (1) “Removal of the tree from the lot is not a repair or replacement, but merely something necessary before the physical work of restoration of the damaged structure can begin.”
     (2) “The exemption from liability applies when the homeowner has 'fire and extended coverage insurance' with applicable coverage. Considering the varying types of insurance that the market may provide, there is no evidence that the insurance required under the contract terminology must cover tree removal. Whether such a policy would is left to speculation.”
     (3) “The tree removal would necessarily involve removal of a portion of the tree from the common area as well as from Defendant's lot and home. I question whether, in any event, the total removal cost should be assigned to the defendant rather than some prorated amount.”
     It is important to ensure that HOA agreements include provisions that would govern a broad spectrum of potential issues and disputes. The law firm of Lafayette, Ayers & Whitlock, PLC has experience in drafting, reviewing, and amending HOA documents, as well as, representing HOAs in court.

Collection: A Salute to Our Credit Unions

     "People-helping-people". This is the philosophy of our nation's credit unions. Our credit unions quickly tell us that they offer a better means of acquiring reasonably priced financial services for everyone. This philosophy has yielded a great growth in membership.
     Having worked as counsel for numerous credit unions over the years, I can attest to the positive force that credit unions are. I can also attest to the benefits that credit unions bring to their members. Most credit unions are able to provide a full service of savings, checking, ATM, loans (personal, car, mortgages) and much more.
     Many businesses are unaware that although they may be too small to start their own credit union, they are not too small to associate with an existing credit union. Such an association would provide both the credit union and the business with great benefits. The credit union will receive new members and business. The businesses will receive the membership and services of the credit union. I am pleased to serve as a "facilitator" to such associations. Those who are interested should contact me.  Together we can all benefit from the credit union movement.

Real Estate: Using Real Estate as a Collection Tool

     Collecting money owed can be a job. Having more tools to do the work is good! Securing your debt with real estate is a great tool. Each month in Creditor News we will explore ways to use this tool (You can access Creditor News by going to www.lawplc.com). Articles will include such topics as: Deeds of Trust, Foreclosure, Docketing Judgments, Lis Pendens, Recording Mechanic’s Liens, Suits to Enforce Mechanic’s Liens, Foreclosing on Mechanic’s Liens, Recording Homeowners Association Liens, Foreclosing on Homeowners Association Liens and more.
     We have experienced attorneys and staff who can examine title, do real estate closings, seek judgment and docket and enforce the same, and prepare and enforce statutory liens, such as those for litigation, homeowner’s associations and mechanic lien situations. Please call me so that we can discuss how we can help you.

Foreclosure: Be Prepared to Conduct Foreclosures

     While foreclosure may not be a topic that debtors (or even creditors) want to discuss, like all other aspects of proper business planning, you should.
     With more creditors engaging in loans secured by real estate (which I strongly advocate), be by first deeds of trust, second or subsequent deeds of trust, refinances or credit lines, a certain amount of default is to be expected. Being prepared to react to default is imperative.
     At the law firm of Lafayette, Ayers & Whitlock, PLC, we represent creditors - from start to finish. We are a full-service creditor’s rights firm. While many attorneys do “collections”, few attorneys have the trained expertise and staff to represent creditors in all four areas of Creditor’s Rights—Collections, Bankruptcy, Real Estate and Foreclosure. WE DO FORECLOSURES. We will handle foreclosure proceedings from demand to final accounting.

Foreclosure: Obtaining Possession after Foreclosure

     Upon purchasing property at a foreclosure sale, it is not uncommon to have a “holdover tenant”. If this occurs, you can obtain possession of the property by filing a Summons for Unlawful Detainer in the appropriate General District Court. The applicable statute requires that the plaintiff prove “a right to the possession of the premises at the time of the commencement of the suit.” The only evidence that is usually required is (a) a copy of the recorded trustee’s deed, since the facts recited therein are prima facie evidence of their truth, and (b) a copy of the notice to vacate sent to the occupant(s).
     On the date of the initial return, if the defendant fails to appear, possession will be granted. If the matter is contested, most courts set a new date for trial. In contested cases, issues are usually related to notice and service, so the trustee should be prepared to present evidence that the foreclosure sale was properly advertised, noticed and conducted.
     The judgment for possession is not final until 10 days after it is entered, and most courts will not issue a writ of possession during that 10-day pendency. If an appeal is noted within the 10-day period, the defendant must perfect the appeal by posting an appeal bond and paying within 30 days of the date of the judgment the applicable writ and service fees for the circuit court. Most judges are sympathetic to require significant appeal bonds equating with the former mortgage payments.
     Eviction is accomplished using a “Request for Writ of Possession.” A writ of possession may be issued on an unlawful detainer for up to one year from the date of judgment. When requesting the writ of possession, provide contact information for both the Sheriff and the person who will supervise the eviction of the new owner; the Sheriff will coordinate a date and time to serve the writ of possession and maintain the peace while the owner physically evicts the personal property of the occupant(s) and secures the property.

Real Estate: Using Deeds of Trust to Secure Your First, Second, Equity Line or Refinance Home Loans

      Properly securing debts through real estate could make the difference between collecting the funds and incurring a loss. In this blog, we will review the benefits of securing your first, second, equity line or refinance home loans with a deed of trust.
      Real estate liens provide important security for your debt. Since real estate is the largest investment and asset for most individuals, they will usually make every effort to pay debts secured by their real estate first. However, you need to know the chain of title in order to make an informed decision about your loan. Specifically, in what position will your lien be? Are there any “clouds” on the title? You will not know the answer to these questions without a proper title search and review.
      Once you know your position you will need to examine the available equity to cover your loan. What is the value? What are the balances due on the liens ahead of your anticipated position? Beyond the business decision of determining when the equity is sufficient for your risk tolerance, in order to take advantage of the “$1.00 rule” in the bankruptcy code for chapter 13 cases (should your debtor decide to later file bankruptcy), you need to ensure that there is at least $1.00 in equity to cover the loan. You should take into consideration that property values may go down (e.g., 2008 to present).
      If the deal is made and the real estate closing occurs, immediate and proper recording of your deed of trust is essential to preserve your position. If the debtor defaults, foreclosure on the property can occur. If the debtor seeks reorganization of his debt in chapter 13, you can seek full payment of the debt.
      We have experienced attorneys and staff who can examine title and properly represent your interests in real estate closings.

Bankruptcy: An Examination of the Dischargeability of Debts Regarding Property Damage-Malice

     In a past blog I began a multi-issue review of cases that address the dischargeability of debts regarding property damage-malice. The relevant bankruptcy code provision is §523(a)(6). I briefly established the standard used by courts to determine dischargeability of debts involving property damage and discussed how the court applied the standard to a case involving rented property.
     In the case of First Nat'l Bank of Md. v. Stanley, the United States Bankruptcy Court at Baltimore, Maryland, ruled that a debtor, whose creditor bank mistakenly extended his line of credit, and who used that windfall to purchase property that he speculated would shortly rise in value, converted the bank's money, despite his "good intentions" toward repayment, and discharge of the debt to the bank was denied as "willful and malicious" injury to the creditor under Bankruptcy Code §523(a)(6).
     The Court ruled that the act or conduct at issue in Stanley was conversion - an unauthorized exercise of dominion or control over property belonging to another that seriously interferes with the owner's rights. Although a person need not know that someone else has superior ownership rights in the property to be technically liable for the tort of conversion, the Court held that the test for malice under Vaughn requires such knowledge on the debtor's part before discharge will be denied - in other words, the debtor must have engaged in a "wrongful" conversion.
     In this case, the Court found that conversion was wrongful. The debtor knew that something was amiss when his credit limit on his line of credit was suddenly increased by a factor of ten. His explanation that he thought the bank had granted him a $73,000 "unsecured" line of credit was wholly irreconcilable with his knowledge that, just three months earlier, he had been approved for $2,000 less than the relatively modest secured line that they had requested. The Court pointed out that the debtor, though not a loan officer, was an accountant with one year of graduate school education; he was, by no means, unsophisticated.
     The proper focus in this case was not on debtor's "good intentions", but simply on his exercise of dominion and control over funds that he knew belonged to another. The debtor's deliberate conversion of the funds is the intentional, wrongful act that prevented the discharge of this debt to the bank.
     The Court found that the debtor inflicted willful and malicious injury on the bank; thus, he was not entitled to be discharged from the resultant debt.
     A future blog will apply the standard used by courts to determine dischargeability of debts involving property damage to another case involving withheld payments.

Bankruptcy: An Examination of the Dischargeability of Debts Regarding Property Damage-Malice

     In a previous blog I began a multi-issue review of cases that address the dischargeability of debts regarding property damage-malice. The relevant bankruptcy code provision is §523(a)(6). I briefly established the standard used by courts to determine dischargeability of debts involving property damage. The standard is very fact specific so reviewing cases will shed light on how the standard is applied.
     In Appalachian Equipment & Supply Co. v. McDaniel, the United States Bankruptcy Court at Harrisonburg, Virginia, determined that the creditor/plaintiff, a rental company, had satisfied all of the elements necessary to prove its case under Bankruptcy Code §523(a)(6), and thus, its claim for damages from the improper use of the forklift was declared exempt from discharge.
     The Court in McDaniel ruled that the physical evidence was the most reliable evidence offered. That evidence showed that the forklift was delivered to the debtor in normal operable condition. It also showed that when the creditor picked up the forklift, it was damaged and displayed light blue paint on the bottom of the carriage. The debtor's evidence showed that one of the vehicles which was placed on the tractor trailer was a light-blue car. To the Court, it appeared more likely than not that the bottom portion of the carriage of the forklift was used in conjunction with attempting to crush the light-blue car such that paint flecks from the car attached themselves to the underside of the carriage. The Court indicated that it was satisfied that the expert testimony of the witness for the creditor established that more likely than not that the carriage of the forklift was used to apply hydraulic pressure in a downward direction with such force that the carriage boon and forks of the forklift were damaged. In conclusion, the Court found that the debtor used the carriage to accomplish his intent to crush cars, such use was inconsistent with the normal usage of the forklift, and such usage led to the damage of the forklift. The Court further found that the creditor proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor's actions in using the forklift were intentional.
     The Court in McDaniel found that the debtor knew that a forklift should not be used to crush cars. The physical evidence and the expert evidence offered by the creditor were more persuasive than the debtor's attempts to deflect blame to another person. It showed that the debtor applied the boon portion of the forklift to employ downward hydraulic pressure to the crush the cars. The Court ruled that it was satisfied that the debtor used the forklift in an improper manner to crush the cars in order to load them onto his flatbed trailer. The Court found that the debtor was an experienced forklift operator. He brought equipment to the site which could have been used to safely crush the cars. He used the forklift in a manner inconsistent with the generally accepted practice for the usage of this type of forklift. In light of these surrounding circumstances, the Court ruled that the debtor knew, or should have known, that his acts would cause damage to the forklift and resulting harm to the creditor. Thus, the Court ruled that the debtor's actions fit the definition of malice as set forth in the case of St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, the standard for denial of discharge.
     In a future blog I will apply the standard used by courts to determine dischargeability of debts involving property damage to a case involving withheld payments.

Bankruptcy: An Examination of the Dischargeability of Debts Regarding Property Damage-Malice

     In a past blog I announced that we would begin a multi-issue review of cases that address the dischargeability of debts regarding property damage-malice. The relevant bankruptcy code provision is §523(a)(6).
     Several cases illustrate well the dischargeability of debts involving property damage. In all cases, the trial and appellate courts are required to adhere to Bankruptcy Code §523(a)(6), which states that a debt causing willful and malicious injury to another entity is not exempt from discharge.
     The standard established by the courts to prove willful and malicious injury is described by the court in St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vaughn. In Vaughn, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that the debtor must show, by contradicted and unimpeached evidence, to have committed a willful and malicious injury to the creditor’s property. There is no requirement of specific malice on the part of the debtor, however. The court held that “willful and malicious” injury means injury that is wrongful and without cause or excuse, but the debtor does not necessarily need to have ill will.
     However, this is a very general definition. Courts have applied this standard to many different situations and it is clear that this standard is very fact specific.  A future blog will apply and expand this standard in a case involving rented property.

Bankruptcy: Dischargeability of Debts Regarding Property Damage-Malice

     In a future blog, we will begin a multi-issue review of cases that address the dischargeability of debts regarding property damage-malice.
     Several cases illustrate well the dischargeability of debts involving property damage. In all cases, the trial and appellate courts are required to adhere to Bankruptcy Code §523(a)(6) which states that a debt causing willful and malicious injury to another entity is not exempt from discharge.
     If you have cases involving property damage that may fall within this code section, please let me know.

Foreclosure: Foreclosure Sale Deficiency Actions

     Frequently there will be a deficiency balance after the sale is completed and the accounting is done. The account of sale will set forth the distribution of the sale proceeds and also establish any amounts remaining due on the indebtedness following application of the net proceeds from the foreclosure sale. This deficiency amount is usually recovered by a personal judgment against the maker of the promissory note or other obligors on the indebtedness that was secured by the deed of trust. An action to recover the deficiency balance remaining after a foreclosure sale need not be brought on the chancery side of the court, and may properly be brought as an action at law. A plaintiff’s action to recover on an assumed promissory note may be maintained as an action at law even though the plaintiff is not named in the deed of trust.

Real Estate: Homeowner Association - Easements

     Cases involving HOA powers are frequently fact specific and governing document specific. Recently, the Frederick County Circuit Court decided a case in which a homeowners association was held in violation of the homeowners association’s restrictive covenants and liable for compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees because it removed a wall on a homeowner’s property. The homeowner spent a considerable amount of time and effort improving a portion of a shared roadway that was on his property. He cleared the land, widened the pathway, and built an eight foot retention wall along the pathway. The HOA notified the homeowner that the wall was encroaching on the right of way and told the homeowner that it must be removed at the homeowner’s expense. There was no board of directors hearing or meeting before the decision was made. Without further notice, the wall was removed but the homeowner refused to pay. In addition to tearing down the wall, the HOA installed drainage culverts in the right of way which resulted in silt flowing into the property’s septic system. The HOA filed suit and obtained a General District Court judgment for the expense of removing the wall. The homeowner then appealed the judgment to the Frederick County Circuit Court and filed a complaint against the HOA. The homeowner claimed that the HOA acted outside its authority under the restrictive covenants, which constituted trespass. The HOA filed a counterclaim, alleging breach of contract and violation of the Property Owners’ Association Act (Va. Code Section 55-508). The court held in favor of the homeowner and found that the HOA exceeded its authority under the restrictive covenants. The HOA did not have authority to remove the wall or to install the drainage culverts. In addition, the HOA did not have the ability to charge the homeowner for either the removal of the wall or the installment of the drainage culverts. The court awarded the homeowner compensatory damages of $28,500 (the value of the wall and cost of returning the property to its prior condition) and attorneys’ fees of $48,844.
     It is important to ensure that HOA covenants provide for the powers necessary to take self-help to effect repairs and remove violations. It is also important for HOAs to work through the proper channels and act within its authority granted by restrictive covenants. Failing to do so can be costly for an HOA. The law firm of Lafayette, Ayers & Whitlock, PLC has experience in drafting, reviewing, and amending HOA documents, as well as, representing HOAs in court.

Foreclosure: Foreclosure Sale Accounting

     The Code of Virginia requires that the trustee’s accounting be filed with the appropriate commissioner of accounts “within six months after the date of a sale.” The Manual for Commissioners of Accounts states that “although the Commissioner does not have specific statutory authority to extend the six month filing date, some courts allow the Commissioner to extend the deadline for good cause shown in advance of the filing date.”

Real Estate: Statute of Limitations Enforced on Challenge to Bylaws Amendment

     The Virginia Condominium Act, specifically Virginia Code Section 55-79.71(C), provides for a statute of limitations in regard to challenging amendments to governing documents. The section provides, in part:
     “An action to challenge the validity of an amendment adopted by the unit owners’ association pursuant to this section may not be brought more than one year after the amendment is recorded.”
     In the case of Godwin v. Bay Point Association Board of Directors, a Norfolk Circuit Court was faced with a homeowner challenge to bylaw amendments. The homeowner, Godwin, had sued the association alleging that it breached its governing documents by taking actions four years earlier and three years earlier that increased her assessment for insurance premiums. The association filed a motion to dismiss Godwin’s complaint on the ground that it was time-barred pursuant to Virginia Code Section 55-79.71(C).
     Four years earlier the association’s board of directors signed a resolution regarding physical damage and flood insurance. Three years earlier it drafted and signed a bylaw amendment relating to insurance premiums. The association argued that challenging either of these actions was time-barred under the statute of limitations.
     The court ruled that the resolution was not an amendment to the condominium governing documents within the meaning of the act. The court found that, at most, the resolution represented a statement of the board’s opinion that the bylaws should be amended to revise the way insurance premiums were assessed against the unit owners. In the resolution, the board acknowledged the need to amend the bylaws and stated that the amendment process was lengthy and inconsistent with the budget preparation schedule for the upcoming fiscal year. Because the resolution was not an amendment adopted by the unit owners pursuant to the act, the court found that the act’s statute of limitations did not apply. However, the court ruled that the bylaws amendment was an amendment to the governing documents within the definition contemplated by the act. Accordingly, the one-year statute of limitations applied.
     Godwin argued that because the association violated mandatory procedures for amending the bylaws, the amendment was null and void, and thus, the statute of limitations did not apply. The court, however, in examining the statute, noted that nothing in the statute suggested that only valid bylaw amendments are subject to the one-year statute of limitations. The court noted that any amendment, not just valid ones, may be challenged within one year. Accordingly, Godwin’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
     Godwin then tried to argue that there was a breach of fiduciary duty (the legal duty of the board to act in the best interests of the residents). Godwin and the association agreed that an action for such breach must be filed within two years from the date of breach. Godwin argued that, although the association initially breached its fiduciary duty four and three years earlier “when in bad faith it knowingly and willfully” adopted the resolution and the bylaws amendment, there were renewed breaches when the annual budgets were adopted in the last two years, which reflected the change made to assessments for insurance premiums. The court disagreed, finding that any breach of fiduciary duty relating to the change in the insurance premium assessment took place when the association acted four and three years ago to adopt the resolution and bylaw amendment. The latest of these actions occurred over two years prior to Godwin’s filing suit. Therefore, the claim was time-barred.