Monday, September 7, 2026

Collections: Pre Default Waiver of Notice of Sale is Void

In the case Woodward v. Resource Bank, from the Circuit Court, City of Virginia Beach, the Virginia Supreme Court reviewed provisions in a promissory note that provided for the debtors' waiver of notice of the default sale of the collateral securing the loan. In Woodward, a married couple operated a gas station and convenience store in Portsmouth and desired to expand. The couple obtained the financing necessary to purchase a store in Virginia Beach (the Pavilion Store) from a bank. In doing so the couple executed a note for $80,000.00 which was secured by a second deed of trust on their home, as well as with security interests in the inventory and equipment at the Pavilion Store. Later the couple decided to purchase a third store in Virginia Beach. They obtained financing from the same bank by executing a note in the amount of $90,900.00, and by signing a security agreement which granted the bank a security interest in the equipment and inventory of all three stores. The bank required the principal shareholders of the corporation to sign a guaranty for $45,000.00 of the $90,900.00 note. The guarantee agreement stated that the liability of the guarantors would not be affected by "any failure to ... give any required notices" by the bank.  

The couple defaulted on the note and the bank demanded that the guarantors honor their respective guaranties. Thereafter, the bank sold the collateral securing the notes without formal notice. The collateral was sold at prices far below the stated value. The shareholders argued that they were entitled to notice of the sale, notwithstanding that they had signed pre-default waivers of notice, because they were "debtors" within the meaning of Virginia Code §8.9-105(1)(d) and §8.9-504(3). The Virginia Beach Circuit Court agreed with the bank that the waivers precluded the necessity of giving notice, but the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that since the shareholders were "debtors" within the meaning of the statutes, they were entitled to notice of the disposition of the collateral. Applying the plain language of Virginia Code §8.9-504(3), the Virginia Supreme Court held that the notice provision contained therein may not be waived before the occurrence of a default.

The Virginia Supreme Court further ruled that a rebuttable presumption arose that the value of the collateral that the bank sold equaled the amount of the debt because the bank failed to give notice to the guarantors, and because the sale was thus "commercially-unreasonable". Virginia Code §8.9-504(3) requires that every aspect of the disposition of collateral, including "the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable". Because the bank failed to rebut this presumption by putting on evidence to the contrary, the Court ruled that the indebtedness was extinguished, and the creditor was precluded from further collection. 

The lesson of Woodward is simple: always obtain a legal opinion regarding sales of reclaimed security, and always follow the requirements of the applicable statutes.

Monday, August 31, 2026

Foreclosure: Deeds of Trust

It all starts with the deed of trust. The deed of trust is the primary method of acquiring a lien against real estate in Virginia. With a deed of trust, the owner of the real estate conveys legal title to a trustee, in trust, to secure the noteholder’s indebtedness. A deed of trust establishes a lien on the subject real estate upon execution by the grantor and recordation in the land records of the Circuit Court for the jurisdiction (County or City) in which the property is located. While recording the deed of trust is not essential to the validity of the deed of trust between the parties, an unrecorded deed of trust does not establish a lien on the subject real estate as to other creditors and purchasers of the grantor. An unrecorded deed of trust will not provide the beneficiary of the deed of trust with a priority position against other creditors with recorded liens, even if they are subsequent in time.

Monday, August 24, 2026

Real Estate: Making Owners and General Contractors Personally Liable to Subcontractor, Laborer or Materialman

Virginia Code §43-11 provides a way for owners or general contractors to be made personally liable to subcontractor, laborer or materialman if notice is appropriately given, and if the payer makes payment to the owing party without paying the notifying creditor. Specifically, §43-11 (2) states that:

“…if such subcontractor, or person furnishing labor or material shall at any time after the work is done or material furnished by him and before the expiration of thirty days from the time such building or structure is completed or the work thereon otherwise terminated furnish the owner thereof or his agent and also the general contractor, or the general contractor alone in case he is the only one notified, with a second notice stating a correct account, verified by affidavit, of his actual claim against the general contractor or subcontractor, for work done or materials furnished and of the amount due, then the owner, or the general contractor, if he alone was notified, shall be personally liable to the claimant for the actual amount due to the subcontractor or persons furnishing labor or material by the general contractor or subcontractor, provided the same does not exceed the sum in which the owner is indebted to the general contractor at the time the second notice is given or may thereafter become indebted by virtue of his contract with the general contractor, or in case the general contractor alone is notified the sum in which he is indebted to the subcontractor at the time the second notice is given or may thereafter become indebted by virtue of his contract with the general contractor. But the amount which a person supplying labor or material to a subcontractor can claim shall not exceed the amount for which such subcontractor could file his claim.”

The notices referred to in this code section are commonly referred to in the industry as “42-11 letters”. We have experienced attorneys and staff who can examine title, file mechanic’s liens, and litigate to enforce the same. If you have a need, please call us.

Monday, August 17, 2026

Bankruptcy: Dischargeability - False Oath

In the case of Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. McFarland, the United States Bankruptcy Court, sitting in Arlington, Virginia, Judge Tice, denied the debtor, a real estate developer, a discharge in bankruptcy because of false testimony.

The creditor had brought a complaint objecting to dischargeability because of allegedly false testimony given by the debtor in examinations under oath after the filing of the debtor's bankruptcy petition.

The Court found as fact that the debtor gave false testimony under oath 1) that he did not receive from a closely held corporation any proceeds of a $440.00 certificate of deposit, when in fact he and his co-shareholder each received $220,000 and 2) that he had no bank accounts in nor made any deposits to offshore banks, when in fact he drew checks in amounts in excess of $300,000 payable to a Cayman Island bank. 

Although the debtor denied that he had any fraudulent intent when he testified, the Court found it "highly implausible" that the debtor forgot about the withdrawal of the $220,000. The debtor also failed to produce any credible evidence refuting the natural presumption that some $300,000 worth of checks admittedly drawn by debtor payable to an offshore bank were transfers of funds to the bank or to an account in the bank.

Accordingly, Judge Tice found the evidence sufficient to warrant denial of the debtor's discharge.