Foreclosure: Deed in lieu of Foreclosure

     In certain cases it may be more practical for the lender to seek or accept from the borrower a deed in lieu of foreclosure rather than incur the expense of foreclosure – this is at the lender’s discretion. If the lender agrees, in return for voluntarily surrendering the property, the borrower will seek either partial or complete satisfaction of the debt. 

     Considerations. Before accepting the deed in lieu of foreclosure, the lender must consider many matters: 

     1. Value of the property vs. the amount of the debt. 

     2. Other debts on the property. A deed in lieu of foreclosure does not extinguish prior or junior liens or encumbrances. Thus the lender, in accepting the deed, accepts the property with the liens. It is possible for the lender to structure the deed in lieu of foreclosure so that it does not release the deed of trust so as to preserve a future foreclosure to extinguish subordinate liens. 

Bankruptcy: Voluntary Conveyance - Debtor's Inheritance

     In the case of Shaia v. Meyer, the United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division, Judge Tice ruled that a bankruptcy trustee may recover funds a debtor inherited from his father and used to pay off two mortgages on property the debtor owned with his wife in a tenancy by the entirety. Essentially, the Court ruled that the debtor's payments constituted a voluntary or fraudulent conveyance that could be recovered by the bankruptcy estate.

Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Petition - Substantial Abuse

     The United States Bankruptcy Court at Harrisonburg, Virginia, in the case of In Re: Rodriguez, dismissed a debtor’s Chapter 7 petition for “substantial abuse” pursuant to Bankruptcy Code §707(b) where the debtor’s voluntary monthly contribution of $286 to his 401(k), as well as his post-petition purchase of a Ford pickup truck, clearly indicated that the had the ability to fully fund a Chapter 13 plan without incurring undue hardship.
     The Bankruptcy Court found that the debtors’ post-petition purchase of the new truck resulted in a net increase in monthly transportation-related expenses of $220. This voluntary increase indicated that the debtor felt that he had the ability to pay at least that amount to his creditors. The increase in transportation-related expenses and the contribution to the 401(k) alone total over $500 per month that the debtor could have used to pay his creditors. In doing so, the debtor could have paid his creditors 100 percent in less than 10 months. Conversely, if the debtor remained in Chapter 7, the majority of his creditors would receive nothing.
     The debtor’s Schedule I indicated that he enjoyed steady employment with the same employer for eight years, and expected to earn $38,000 in that current year. Nothing in the other schedules filed with the debtor’s petition indicated a sudden illness or calamity which might have necessitated filing for Chapter 7 protection.
     The Bankruptcy Court found that the debtor’s post-petition truck purchase, made with the knowledge that a short-term 100 percent Chapter 13 plan was feasible, constituted the kind of egregious abuse that Bankruptcy Code §707(b) was intended to prevent.
     The lesson of Rodriguez - review Chapter 7 schedules for the ability to pay.

Collections: Equal Opportunity Act

     In a previous blog, we began a review of The Equal Opportunity Credit Act ("the ECOA" or "the Act").
     There are many potential issues that have been raised under the Act -- in the previous blog I listed the first six; listed below are five more which have been cited most frequently.
     7. Requiring certain types of life insurance before issuing a loan.
     8. Basing a credit decision on the area in which the applicant lives, such as the fact that a white applicant lived in a largely black area.
     9. Changing the terms of a credit account without notifying the borrower within 30 days and including a boiler plate notice concerning the borrower's rights under the ECOA.
     10. Asking about an applicant's intentions to have children.
     11. Asking for the applicant's title (Mr., Mrs., Ms., etc.) without stating that providing this information is optional.
     There are also many potential defenses that have been raised by lenders; listed below are those which have been cited most frequently.
     1. Voluntary signatures are okay. Although a spouse cannot be required to co-sign a note, voluntary signatures are okay. Thus, the lender can win if it can show that the spouse's signature was voluntary.
     2. One spouse was not enough. A lender can argue that the applicant's spouse did not satisfy it's credit criteria all alone, and the other spouse's assets figured into his loan decision, which is why the other spouse's signature was required.
     3. Both spouses are principals. If both spouses are principals in a business, the lender can argue that it required both of their signatures because of their business relationship rather than their marital status.
     4. Pre-1986 guarantors. ECOA regulations were expanded to include guarantors as of October 1, 1986. Courts have been split as to whether they apply to guarantors if a bank violated the Act before that date but renewed the note after it.
     5. Good Faith. A lender is not liable if it acted in good faith compliance with the Federal Reserve Board's "official staff interpretation" of the ECOA, which can be found at 12 C.F.R. §202.
     We will continue our review of the Act in a future blog.