Showing posts with label exempt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label exempt. Show all posts

Monday, May 25, 2020

Bankruptcy: Dischargeability of Debts - Piercing the Corporate Veil

     In the case of Hodnett v. Loevner, Judge Tice of the United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Virginia held that a bankruptcy debtor is not insulated from the dischargeability issues raised under Bankruptcy Code §523 (a)(4) by virtue of the fact that the transactions were done in the name of a corporation. 
     The debtor had transferred the plaintiff/creditor's trust funds to a limited partnership of which the investment company, the debtor's alter ego, was a general partner, without any notice to the plaintiff. Further, the debtor failed to properly account for the location of the funds. The debtor was also an officer, director and 50 percent shareholder in the corporation, and most importantly, was the person who made the investment decisions concerning client funds. The debtor was the alter ego of the investment company, and the Court found that the company was used in conjunction with the limited partnership to obscure fraudulent conduct with respect to the plaintiff. Therefore, the Court invoked the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil to hold the debtor personally liable for acts of the corporation.
     The Court held that the judgment was also exempt from discharge under Bankruptcy Code §523(a)(2)(A) because of the debtor's actual fraud. The debtor's statements, reports and correspondence concerning the existence of certificates of deposits were misrepresentations of material facts which were made by the debtor in an effort to deceive the plaintiff, and upon which the plaintiff relied, permitting the debtor and the investment company to use the trust funds in violation of an express trust. As a result of those misrepresentations, the debtor lost $107,000 of the plaintiff's trust funds. The Court found that this conduct on the part of the debtor constituted fraud.
     The Court further found that even if it could be argued that the debtor intended to repay the funds, his lending the plaintiff's funds on an unsecured basis while lying to the plaintiff about the nature of the investment constituted reckless conduct tantamount to fraud.

Monday, June 11, 2018

Collections: Garnishing Joint Accounts

     Can a creditor with a judgment against one party to a joint bank account garnish the account? Yes, but the judgment creditor is entitled only to that portion of the account which is attributable to the deposits of the judgment debtor. Virginia Code §6.1-125.3 holds that if the joint account holders are married, then the judgment creditor is entitled to half of the funds in the account, unless one of the married parties proves a different intent by clear and convincing evidence. Upon learning that the bank account is jointly held, the creditor must serve notice to the non-judgment account holder, as well as to the judgment debtor. Courts have ruled, however, that married account holders could attempt to protect bank accounts by asserting that the accounts were exempt from execution if they were held as tenants by the entireties. 

Monday, April 23, 2018

Bankruptcy: Exemption: Worker's Compensation Award

     In the case of In Re Nelson, the United States Bankruptcy Court at Big Stone Gap, Virginia, ruled that where a debtor used his worker's compensation award, which is exempt from the bankruptcy estate under Virginia Code §65.2-531, to purchase a mobile home and lot, the mobile home and lot are also exempt from the Court's consideration in determining whether the debtor's proposed plan is feasible under Bankruptcy Code §1322(a)(4).
     It was the trustee's position in Nelson that since the workers' compensation benefits had been invested in the mobile home and lot that the funds were no longer exempt under Virginia Code §65.2-531. The Court in Nelson stated that Virginia Code §65.2-531 is explicit and unambiguous. The statute simply states that all compensation and claims shall be exempt from all claims of creditors. It does not say that once the funds are invested in other properties they become nonexempt. The Court stated that such a construction cannot be read into the statute, which could be in violation of the authorities. The Court also concluded that if the Virginia legislature had intended to make the funds nonexempt upon investment, then it would have so provided.
     The Court, in deciding Nelson, stated that it found only one case bearing on this subject matter, which was a New Hampshire case, In Re: Williams; the Court found no prior reported Virginia cases. In the New Hampshire case a debtor was allowed to keep a corvette purchased with a worker's compensation award. The Court in Nelson stated that it would be useless to exempt workers' compensation benefits received by an employee who was injured, and yet that employee could not invest those funds in other properties without losing his exemption status. It is clear that the Virginia legislature in passing Virginia Code §65.2-531 and providing for exemptions therein fully intended that the proceeds from these funds, and the purchase of property from the said funds, would be exempt.
     Therefore, the Court in Nelson held that the mobile home and lot purchased from the proceeds of workers' compensation benefits, pursuant to Virginia Code §65.2-531, were exempt properties and were not to be considered in determining whether the plan of the debtor conforms to Bankruptcy Code §1325(a)(4).

Monday, January 16, 2017

Bankruptcy: Retirement Plan Exemptions - IRA - SEP - Pension Plan in Chapter 7

     The United States Bankruptcy Court, in Alexandria, in the case of In re: Bissell, ruled that where a debtor has an IRA, an SEP and an ERISA-qualified pension plan, his exemption under Virginia Code §34-34 is computed without regard to the pension plans. The Bankruptcy Court rejected the creditor’s attempt to apply the value of the ERISA-qualified plan to the amount exempt under Virginia law, so as to wipe out the exemption for the IRA or the SEP and obtain an additional $71,538 for the bankruptcy estate.
     The debtor asserted that the maximum exemption allowable under Virginia Code §34-34 for his individual retirement account and his simplified employer plan was computed without regard to his ERISA-qualified pension plan. He aggregated the value of the IRA and the SEP and applied the maximum allowable under exemption, $52,955, against this amount. He acknowledged that since the IRA and SEP have a total value of $71,538.52, the excess over the maximum allowable exemption of the IRA and SEP, $18,583.52, was not exempt under Virginia Code §34-34. The ERISA-qualified pension plan does not form a part of the computation because it, unlike the IRA and SEP, is not property of the estate.
     The creditor asserted that the value of the ERISA-qualified pension plan must first be applied to the $52,955 amount exempt under Virginia Code §34-34. Since the pension plan had a value of $363,915.13, this method of computing the allowable exemption would exhaust the $52,955 exemption allowed under §34-34. There would be no exemption remaining available for the IRA or the SEP and the full value of the two accounts, $71,538.52, would be turned over to the trustee. 
     The Bankruptcy Court found that the creditor’s interpretation of §34-34 was contrary to the commonly accepted practice. The Bankruptcy Court ruled that the definition of “retirement plan” in Virginia Code §34-34 must be read narrowly to exclude ERISA-qualified pension plans. To hold otherwise would invoke federal preemption which would exclude ERISA-qualified pension plans in any event and possibly preempt the entire statute. It would frustrate the General Assembly’s intent to protect retirement plans.
     The Bankruptcy Court ruled that the Virginia General Assembly confronted the inherent problems in using §55-19 and spendthrift trusts to protect retirement plans. It sought for the first time to comprehensively remedy the problems and to provide greater and better protection for retiree’s pension plans, in particular ERISA-qualified pension plans. The General Assembly’s chosen route was the establishment of a uniform exemption for all retirees. The Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Patterson v. Shumate changed one of the underlying assumptions of the General Assembly by definitively holding that ERISA-qualified pension plans were not property of the bankruptcy estate. Had the General Assembly intended to adhere to the uniform exemption for retirees, it could have easily amended Virginia Code §34-34 to expressly reduce the exemption of non-ERISA-qualified pension plans, such as IRAs and SEPs, that were covered by Virginia Code §34-34 by the amount of any ERISA-qualified pension plan excluded from the bankruptcy estate or exempt from creditors in a state court proceeding. It did not. It accepted that ERISA-qualified pension plans could be reached by neither bankruptcy trustees in bankruptcy nor creditors in state court and it expanded the exemptions available based, in part, on this premise. The 1996 General Assembly protected rollover contributions. In 1999, the General Assembly added Roth IRAs. With some restrictions, the 1999 amendment also placed IRAs, SEPs, and Roth IRAs on the same footing as 401 plans and other ERISA-qualified pension plans. This partially reduced the inequality between those plans, although it did not completely eliminate it. The Bankruptcy Court ruled that the creditor’s position in this case ran counter to the expanding protections provided by the General Assembly over the last decade and the judicial role of liberal construction of exemption statutes. Its implicit construction contracts the exemption and magnifies the very inequality the General Assembly sought to minimize.
     The Bankruptcy Court overruled the creditor’s objection to debtor’s claim of exemption. The amount of the exemption of the IRA and the SEP under Virginia Code §34-34 was computed without regard to the ERISA-qualified pension plan. The IRA and SEP were exempt in the aggregated amount of $52,955 plus any additional amount allowable under Virginia Code §34-4.











Monday, May 2, 2016

Bankruptcy: Homestead Exemptions - Household Furnishings

     In the case of In Re: John W. Haynes, Jr., the United States Bankruptcy Court at Alexandria, Virginia, ruled that the debtor was entitled to claim as "poor debtor's" exemption from the bankruptcy estate two TV's, a VCR and a stereo as part of his "household furnishings" exempt under Virginia Code §34-26.
     In Haynes, the creditor, a bank, argued that the items claimed as exempt by the debtor were not the type of property that was necessary to run a household, unlike beds, dressers, stoves, eating utensils and other items listed in the statute.
     The Bankruptcy Court, however, stated that it did not read Virginia Code §34-26 so narrowly. In interpreting the statute, the Bankruptcy Court stated that it looked first to the statute's plain language; the Bankruptcy Court noted that the language of the statute was quite broad. The statute allows debtors to exempt from creditor process "all household furnishings", including the items listed in the statute, so long as their value does not exceed $5,000. The term "furnishings" does not necessarily exclude televisions, stereos and VCR's, and the statute includes "non-furniture" items -- such as eating utensils and plates -- as examples of "household furnishings." The Bankruptcy Court also noted that the statute did not contain the term "necessary," which was once included in an earlier version of the statute. The Bankruptcy Court stated that it did not view exceptions under the current statute as being limited to items necessary for maintaining a household. In addition, the Bankruptcy Court noted that longstanding Virginia precedent established that exemption statutes are to be construed liberally. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court overruled the creditor's objection concerning the electronic equipment.

Monday, June 29, 2015

Bankruptcy: Dischargeability - Money Judgment


     In the case of In Re: James H. Harris the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia showed a willingness to assist creditors in clear abuse cases. In Harris Judge Tice determined that a debt which resulted from the debtor's conversion of a stolen Mack Truck was exempt from discharge pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, and determined that the amount of damages excepted from discharge was $11,620.47. The Bankruptcy Court also entered a money judgment for the creditor in that excepted amount, even though at least one Federal District Court has held that a Bankruptcy Court does not have jurisdiction to enter a money judgment in a Bankruptcy Code §523 proceeding.
     Judge Tice stated that every determination by a Bankruptcy Court of the validity of a claim is a determination of whether a creditor is entitled to monetary damages from the debtor. The issues raised regarding the validity or existence or amount of a debt are inextricably interwoven with the determination of dischargeability, and are therefore within the equitable jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court.



Monday, March 17, 2014

Bankruptcy: Dischargeability of Debts Regarding Property Damage-Malice

     In a future blog, we will begin a multi-issue review of cases that address the dischargeability of debts regarding property damage-malice.
     Several cases illustrate well the dischargeability of debts involving property damage. In all cases, the trial and appellate courts are required to adhere to Bankruptcy Code §523(a)(6) which states that a debt causing willful and malicious injury to another entity is not exempt from discharge.
     If you have cases involving property damage that may fall within this code section, please let me know.

Monday, July 1, 2013

Collections: Garnishing Joint Accounts

     Can a creditor with a judgment against one party to a joint bank account garnish the account? Yes, but the judgment creditor is entitled only to that portion of the account which is attributable to the deposits of the judgment debtor. Virginia Code §6.1-125.3 holds that if the joint account holders are married, then the judgment creditor is entitled to half of the funds in the account, unless one of the married parties proves a different intent by clear and convincing evidence. Upon learning that the bank account is jointly held, the creditor must serve notice to the non-judgment account holder, as well as to the judgment debtor. The Spotsylvania Circuit Court recently ruled, however, that married account holders could attempt to protect bank accounts by asserting that the accounts were exempt from execution if they were held as tenants by the entireties.