Bankruptcy: Retirement Plan Exemptions - IRA - SEP - Pension Plan in Chapter 7

     The United States Bankruptcy Court, in Alexandria, in the case of In re: Bissell, ruled that where a debtor has an IRA, an SEP and an ERISA-qualified pension plan, his exemption under Virginia Code §34-34 is computed without regard to the pension plans. The Bankruptcy Court rejected the creditor’s attempt to apply the value of the ERISA-qualified plan to the amount exempt under Virginia law, so as to wipe out the exemption for the IRA or the SEP and obtain an additional $71,538 for the bankruptcy estate.

     The debtor asserted that the maximum exemption allowable under Virginia Code §34-34 for his individual retirement account and his simplified employer plan was computed without regard to his ERISA-qualified pension plan. He aggregated the value of the IRA and the SEP and applied the maximum allowable under exemption, $52,955, against this amount. He acknowledged that since the IRA and SEP have a total value of $71,538.52, the excess over the maximum allowable exemption of the IRA and SEP, $18,583.52, was not exempt under Virginia Code §34-34. The ERISA-qualified pension plan does not form a part of the computation because it, unlike the IRA and SEP, is not property of the estate.
     The creditor asserted that the value of the ERISA-qualified pension plan must first be applied to the $52,955 amount exempt under Virginia Code §34-34. Since the pension plan had a value of $363,915.13, this method of computing the allowable exemption would exhaust the $52,955 exemption allowed under §34-34. There would be no exemption remaining available for the IRA or the SEP and the full value of the two accounts, $71,538.52, would be turned over to the trustee. 
     The Bankruptcy Court found that the creditor’s interpretation of §34-34 was contrary to the commonly accepted practice. The Bankruptcy Court ruled that the definition of “retirement plan” in Virginia Code §34-34 must be read narrowly to exclude ERISA-qualified pension plans. To hold otherwise would invoke federal preemption which would exclude ERISA-qualified pension plans in any event and possibly preempt the entire statute. It would frustrate the General Assembly’s intent to protect retirement plans.
     The Bankruptcy Court ruled that the Virginia General Assembly confronted the inherent problems in using §55-19 and spendthrift trusts to protect retirement plans. It sought for the first time to comprehensively remedy the problems and to provide greater and better protection for retiree’s pension plans, in particular ERISA-qualified pension plans. The General Assembly’s chosen route was the establishment of a uniform exemption for all retirees. The Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Patterson v. Shumate changed one of the underlying assumptions of the General Assembly by definitively holding that ERISA-qualified pension plans were not property of the bankruptcy estate. Had the General Assembly intended to adhere to the uniform exemption for retirees, it could have easily amended Virginia Code §34-34 to expressly reduce the exemption of non-ERISA-qualified pension plans, such as IRAs and SEPs, that were covered by Virginia Code §34-34 by the amount of any ERISA-qualified pension plan excluded from the bankruptcy estate or exempt from creditors in a state court proceeding. It did not. It accepted that ERISA-qualified pension plans could be reached by neither bankruptcy trustees in bankruptcy nor creditors in state court and it expanded the exemptions available based, in part, on this premise. The 1996 General Assembly protected rollover contributions. In 1999, the General Assembly added Roth IRAs. With some restrictions, the 1999 amendment also placed IRAs, SEPs, and Roth IRAs on the same footing as 401 plans and other ERISA-qualified pension plans. This partially reduced the inequality between those plans, although it did not completely eliminate it. The Bankruptcy Court ruled that the creditor’s position in this case ran counter to the expanding protections provided by the General Assembly over the last decade and the judicial role of liberal construction of exemption statutes. Its implicit construction contracts the exemption and magnifies the very inequality the General Assembly sought to minimize.
     The Bankruptcy Court overruled the creditor’s objection to debtor’s claim of exemption. The amount of the exemption of the IRA and the SEP under Virginia Code §34-34 was computed without regard to the ERISA-qualified pension plan. The IRA and SEP were exempt in the aggregated amount of $52,955 plus any additional amount allowable under Virginia Code §34-4.

Bankruptcy: IRA Exemption in Chapter 7

     The United States Bankruptcy Court in Alexandria, in the case of In Re Hasse, ruled that a federal employee who participated in the federal thrift savings plan may claim an unlimited exemption in an individual retirement account, despite the objection of the Chapter 7 trustee.

     The IRA, valued at $100,000, was claimed exempt under Virginia Code §34-34. Virtually all the debtor’s other assets were either encumbered by liens or were exempt, with the result that the IRA was the only asset potentially available for the payment of creditor claims. At issue in this case was the Virginia General Assembly’s decision to amend Virginia Code §34-34 in 1999 by adding subsection H, which provided that an individual who claimed an exemption under federal law for any retirement plan established pursuant to §§ 401, 403(a), 403(b), 409 or 457 of the Internet Revenue Code (“IRC”) shall not be entitled to claim the exemption under this subsection for a retirement plan established pursuant to §408 or §408 A of the IRC. The thrust of the amendment was to give a debtor who had no other tax-qualified retirement plan the right to an unlimited IRA exemption but to deny the unlimited exemption to a person who was covered by such a plan. By giving a person who was not covered by an ERISA-qualified plan the right to an unlimited IRA exemption, such a person would be put on an equal footing with an employee who was a participant in an ERISA-qualified plan.
     The Bankruptcy Court found that a federal thrift savings plan account, while it is similar to, and for tax purposes is treated exactly like a private employer 401(k) plan - was nevertheless not subject to all the regulations governing §401(k) plans. The question was therefore whether, for the purpose of applying §34-34(H), a thrift savings plan account should be treated as a “retirement plan established pursuant to” §401 of the IRC. If so, the debtor was not entitled to a further exemption for his IRA; otherwise, he could exempt it in full.  
     The trustee took the position that Congress, by treating the thrift savings plan for tax purposes in the same fashion as 401(k) plans, sufficiently equated the two for the purposes of applying Virginia Code §34-34(H). Debtor took strenuous exception to that argument and points out that 5 U.S.C. §8440 only governed the tax treatment of thrift savings plan contributions and distributions. The Bankruptcy Court noted that not only did the enabling statute mandate compliance with the “requirements” of §401(k), it expressly exempted it from compliance with two of those requirements.
     The Bankruptcy Court found that the trustee’s argument ignored the words chosen by the Virginia General Assembly. Those words were very precise. The Bankruptcy Court ruled that a debtor was entitled to an unlimited exemption in an IRA unless the debtor was a participant in, or beneficiary of, a plan that is “intended to satisfy the requirements of” and is “established pursuant to” certain specific sections of the IRC. Although the thrift savings plan operates like, and enjoys the tax benefits of, a 401(k) plan, it was not a 401(k) plan and was not subject to all the “requirements” of a 401(k) plan. The Bankruptcy Court stated that for whatever reason, the General Assembly chose not to define “retirement plan” in such a way as to embrace, not only plans “established” under the enumerated sections of the IRC, but also plans treated for tax purposes like such plans.
     Prior the enactment of Virginia Code §34-34(H), only a limited exemption was available in Virginia for IRAs. The Bankruptcy Court found that the statute plainly intended to expand that exemption. The ability of people to provide adequately for their old age is obviously a matter of great public importance, and it is certainly reasonable that the General Assembly would want, as a matter of sound public policy, to protect savings set aside for that purpose.
     Accordingly, the trustee’s objection was overruled and the debtor’s exemption was allowed.