The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia also held that debtor's counsel are not entitled to recover attorney's fees from a creditor where the creditor loses a suit objecting to debtor's discharge unless it is proven that the suit was filed vexatiously, wantonly, in bad faith, or for oppressive reasons in the case of In Re Gecowetts. In Gecowetts the debtor's estranged wife filed an action objecting to the debtor's dischargeability of a debt. After a full trial on this issue, the Court allowed the debtor a discharge of all debts. Relying on the "American Rule," the Court found that although the creditor was unsuccessful in the dischargeability proceeding, the action was not filed vexatiously, wantonly, in bad faith, or for oppressive reasons. Therefore, no fees were awarded.
Showing posts with label challenged. Show all posts
Showing posts with label challenged. Show all posts
Monday, January 12, 2015
Bankruptcy: Award of Attorney's Fees Against Creditors
A debtor sought to recover attorney's fees from a creditor who unsuccessfully challenged the debtor's dischargeability. The creditor had alleged that the items listed on the debtor's statement of financial affairs were materially false, but was unable to convince the Bankruptcy Court. The Bankruptcy Court, however, denied the debtor's request for attorney's fees because there was not evidence that the creditor pursued the complaint frivolously or without substantial justification. The case was In Re: Louise Reynolds Freeman, decided by Judge Tice for the United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia also held that debtor's counsel are not entitled to recover attorney's fees from a creditor where the creditor loses a suit objecting to debtor's discharge unless it is proven that the suit was filed vexatiously, wantonly, in bad faith, or for oppressive reasons in the case of In Re Gecowetts. In Gecowetts the debtor's estranged wife filed an action objecting to the debtor's dischargeability of a debt. After a full trial on this issue, the Court allowed the debtor a discharge of all debts. Relying on the "American Rule," the Court found that although the creditor was unsuccessful in the dischargeability proceeding, the action was not filed vexatiously, wantonly, in bad faith, or for oppressive reasons. Therefore, no fees were awarded.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia also held that debtor's counsel are not entitled to recover attorney's fees from a creditor where the creditor loses a suit objecting to debtor's discharge unless it is proven that the suit was filed vexatiously, wantonly, in bad faith, or for oppressive reasons in the case of In Re Gecowetts. In Gecowetts the debtor's estranged wife filed an action objecting to the debtor's dischargeability of a debt. After a full trial on this issue, the Court allowed the debtor a discharge of all debts. Relying on the "American Rule," the Court found that although the creditor was unsuccessful in the dischargeability proceeding, the action was not filed vexatiously, wantonly, in bad faith, or for oppressive reasons. Therefore, no fees were awarded.
Monday, January 5, 2015
Collection: Bank Deposits - for Deposit Only
The United States District Court at Alexandria reviewed a liability question regarding a bank's treatment of a check marked "for deposit only". In the case of Qatar v. First Am. Bank of Va., the Court ruled that a depositary bank violated a restrictive endorsement stating "for deposit only" when it deposited a check into an account other than the account belonging to the named payee of the check. In Qatar, a foreign embassy employee defrauded the embassy over a six-year period by various methods, including depositing checks written to other parties into his own personal accounts with defendant banks. After the embassy discovered this fraudulent scheme, it sued the depositary bank for conversion. The bank succeeded on summary judgment in establishing that it was not liable as a matter of law with respect to two categories of checks in dispute, and it prevailed on a factual issue at trial that relieved it from liability for yet another category of checks.
Only one category of checks remained in dispute. These checks all bore the forged endorsement of the payee named on the face of the check, followed by a stamped "for deposit only" restriction. At trial, the depositary bank raised no defenses, but instead challenged for the first time the Court's assumption that the phrase "for deposit only," without further specification, directs a depositary bank to deposit the funds only into the account of the named payee. The Court reasoned that the question then presented was whether the bank complied with the restrictive endorsement "for deposit only" when it deposited the check bearing that restriction into any person's account, or whether that restriction requires the bank to deposit the check's proceeds only into the account of the named payee. The Court held that the unqualified language "for deposit only" following an endorsement on the back of a check required the bank to place the check's proceeds into the payee's account, and the bank violated that restrictive endorsement when it credited the check to another account. In this cases, specifically, the bank violated the restrictive endorsement in depositing into the employees account checks made payable to others and restrictively endorsed "for deposit only", and thus was liable to the plaintiff for the money converted.
Only one category of checks remained in dispute. These checks all bore the forged endorsement of the payee named on the face of the check, followed by a stamped "for deposit only" restriction. At trial, the depositary bank raised no defenses, but instead challenged for the first time the Court's assumption that the phrase "for deposit only," without further specification, directs a depositary bank to deposit the funds only into the account of the named payee. The Court reasoned that the question then presented was whether the bank complied with the restrictive endorsement "for deposit only" when it deposited the check bearing that restriction into any person's account, or whether that restriction requires the bank to deposit the check's proceeds only into the account of the named payee. The Court held that the unqualified language "for deposit only" following an endorsement on the back of a check required the bank to place the check's proceeds into the payee's account, and the bank violated that restrictive endorsement when it credited the check to another account. In this cases, specifically, the bank violated the restrictive endorsement in depositing into the employees account checks made payable to others and restrictively endorsed "for deposit only", and thus was liable to the plaintiff for the money converted.
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