The District Court in Dean stated that the Bankruptcy Court did not err in revoking the debtor’s chapter 7 discharge based on the evidence of fraud in the debtor’s earlier reporting of her pre-bankruptcy transfers of property (antiques, collectibles, furniture and jewelry), and her statements about prior involvement in a business, after her operation of a thrift store called “New to You.”
The District Court found as fact that the debtor received a discharge in her chapter 7 case about two years prior. The Bankruptcy Court later reopened the debtor’s case and revoked her discharge based upon the debtor’s fraud. The debtor raised four grounds on appeal: 1) the complaint to revoke her discharge was not timely filed; 2) the U.S. Trustee did not meet an affirmative duty to investigate the debtor’s bankruptcy and therefore constructively knew of the debtor’s fraud; 3) the debtor did not make false oaths because she lacked fraudulent intent and her misstatements were de minimums; and 4) the revocation was based upon inadmissible evidence.
The District Court stated that cases dealing with whether the timely filing of a complaint objecting to discharge is jurisdictional are sharply divided. Despite the overall disagreement among the federal courts, the Fourth Circuit has indicated the position it finds more persuasive: the timeliness of a dischargeability complaint is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, but rather presents an affirmative defense similar to the statute of limitations that must be raised in an answer or responsive pleading. The court noted that there was nothing in the debtor’s brief or the 4th Circuit case, Farouki v. Emirates Bank Int’l ltd., to indicate that the dischargeability time limitation of Bankruptcy Rule 4004(a) should be treated differently from Bankruptcy Code Section 727(e)(1). The District Court stated that it was therefore unnecessary to address whether the U.S. Trustee’s complaint was timely filed because the debtor had waived her right to appeal on this point. Failure to raise a non-jurisdictional issue before the Bankruptcy Court will generally be treated by the District Court as a waiver of the right to have the issue heard.
The District Court stated that the debtor argued for the first time on appeal that the errors and omissions of her schedules should have put the U.S. Trustee on notice of possible fraud, triggering an obligation to investigate. Because the U.S. Trustee began investigating possible fraud only after receiving a telephone call concerning the debtor’s bankruptcy about a year after the entry of the discharge order, the debtor argues that the Trustee could not rely upon the “did not know” provision of Bankruptcy Code Section 727(d)(1). The District Court noted again, however, that the debtor did not raise the issue of the trustee’s knowledge in her answer or at trial, and the issue did not fall within the “very limited circumstances” of plain error which would result in a miscarriage of justice. The debtor waived her right to have this issue considered on appeal.
The District Court next noted that the debtor did not dispute that her schedules and Statement of Financial Affairs contained false oaths. Instead, the debtor argued that she lacked the fraudulent intent, and that her omissions were de minimus. The District Court noted that the Bankruptcy Court’s determination of fraud was a factual finding reviewed for clear error. The District Court concluded that the Bankruptcy Court did not commit clear error in determining that the debtor knowingly and fraudulently made false oaths and that the oaths concerned materials facts. Nor could the District Court find error in the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion that the debtor’s failure to read her bankruptcy papers constituted a reckless indifference to the truth and the functional equivalent of fraud.
Finally, the District Court ruled that the Bankruptcy Court’s admission of certain exhibits relating to the debtor’s fraud, is error at all, did not even approach the standard of error so serious that it went to the integrity of the trial.
Accordingly, the revocation of the debtor’s discharge was upheld.
The District Court found as fact that the debtor received a discharge in her chapter 7 case about two years prior. The Bankruptcy Court later reopened the debtor’s case and revoked her discharge based upon the debtor’s fraud. The debtor raised four grounds on appeal: 1) the complaint to revoke her discharge was not timely filed; 2) the U.S. Trustee did not meet an affirmative duty to investigate the debtor’s bankruptcy and therefore constructively knew of the debtor’s fraud; 3) the debtor did not make false oaths because she lacked fraudulent intent and her misstatements were de minimums; and 4) the revocation was based upon inadmissible evidence.
The District Court stated that cases dealing with whether the timely filing of a complaint objecting to discharge is jurisdictional are sharply divided. Despite the overall disagreement among the federal courts, the Fourth Circuit has indicated the position it finds more persuasive: the timeliness of a dischargeability complaint is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, but rather presents an affirmative defense similar to the statute of limitations that must be raised in an answer or responsive pleading. The court noted that there was nothing in the debtor’s brief or the 4th Circuit case, Farouki v. Emirates Bank Int’l ltd., to indicate that the dischargeability time limitation of Bankruptcy Rule 4004(a) should be treated differently from Bankruptcy Code Section 727(e)(1). The District Court stated that it was therefore unnecessary to address whether the U.S. Trustee’s complaint was timely filed because the debtor had waived her right to appeal on this point. Failure to raise a non-jurisdictional issue before the Bankruptcy Court will generally be treated by the District Court as a waiver of the right to have the issue heard.
The District Court stated that the debtor argued for the first time on appeal that the errors and omissions of her schedules should have put the U.S. Trustee on notice of possible fraud, triggering an obligation to investigate. Because the U.S. Trustee began investigating possible fraud only after receiving a telephone call concerning the debtor’s bankruptcy about a year after the entry of the discharge order, the debtor argues that the Trustee could not rely upon the “did not know” provision of Bankruptcy Code Section 727(d)(1). The District Court noted again, however, that the debtor did not raise the issue of the trustee’s knowledge in her answer or at trial, and the issue did not fall within the “very limited circumstances” of plain error which would result in a miscarriage of justice. The debtor waived her right to have this issue considered on appeal.
The District Court next noted that the debtor did not dispute that her schedules and Statement of Financial Affairs contained false oaths. Instead, the debtor argued that she lacked the fraudulent intent, and that her omissions were de minimus. The District Court noted that the Bankruptcy Court’s determination of fraud was a factual finding reviewed for clear error. The District Court concluded that the Bankruptcy Court did not commit clear error in determining that the debtor knowingly and fraudulently made false oaths and that the oaths concerned materials facts. Nor could the District Court find error in the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion that the debtor’s failure to read her bankruptcy papers constituted a reckless indifference to the truth and the functional equivalent of fraud.
Finally, the District Court ruled that the Bankruptcy Court’s admission of certain exhibits relating to the debtor’s fraud, is error at all, did not even approach the standard of error so serious that it went to the integrity of the trial.
Accordingly, the revocation of the debtor’s discharge was upheld.
No comments:
Post a Comment