In the case of Chopp & Co. v. Luria, the United States Bankruptcy Court at Alexandria, Virginia, concluded that a bankrupt builder's omission from a supplier's credit application of a bank's earlier consent judgment against the builder was not made with the "intent to deceive" and the builder's debt to the supplier was not exempt from discharge pursuant to Bankruptcy Code §523 (a)(2)(B).
The Court found as fact that the debtor signed a credit application which he knew was being submitted to the creditor. The Court further found as fact that the credit application incorrectly represented that the debtor had no judgments entered against him within the last five years when, in fact, there had been a substantial judgment docketed against the debtor within one year of the credit application. The Court also found as fact that the consent order was entered under a workout agreement on a separate loan. The Court further found as fact that the debt had been fully paid off, the judgment did not show up on the builder's credit report, and there was no evidence that the builder knew that the consent order had ever been entered. The Court noted that the judgment at issue arose from a financial workout agreement between the bank, the debtor and other related parties on a large mortgage loan. As part of the agreement, under which the bank was to be paid in full, the debtor and his related entities executed the judgment order by consent. Under the agreement the loan was to be paid by new financing and by sales of property. The consent judgment essentially served as backup protection to the bank if its loan was not fully paid by a set date. This deadline passed without full payment because of delays in settlement under contracts for sale of realty by the debtor's business entities. The contemplated settlement eventually took place, and the bank's judgment had been paid in full six months before the debtor made the credit application at issue.
Considering all of these facts in light of the applicable law, the Court had to determine, in order to find that the debt was nondischargeable, that the debtor's statement was materially false, that the creditor reasonably relied on the statement, and that the debtor had the intent to deceive the creditor.
In regard to the "materially false requirement", the Court ruled that "..the omission of such a substantial judgment from debtor's credit application was plainly a materially false statement..".
Upon considering reasonable reliance, the Court ruled that "...the evidence demonstrates that plaintiff had a very conservative policy on extending credit and that its policy has resulted in lower than average bad debts. Based upon plaintiff's unrefuted evidence, it seems likely that plaintiff would have denied open account credit to debtor's corporation if the judgment had been disclosed...". "..plaintiff's reliance on debtor's credit application was objectively reasonable and was actually relied upon by plaintiff in extending credit...".
In regard to the "intent to deceive" requirement, however, the Court found that the evidence failed to establish that debtor actually knew that the judgment had been docketed. The Court then looked to see if the intent could be imputed through reckless indifference. Given the workout arrangements, given the fact that the judgment was paid within three months of entry, given the fact that no adverse information appeared on the debtor's credit report, and given the fact that there was no evidence that the debtor had been informed of the bank's entry of the judgment, the Court stated that it was unwilling to infer from the circumstantial evidence that the debtor recklessly failed to disclose the judgment. Accordingly the Court concluded that the debtor did not publish the financial statement with intent to deceive plaintiff.