Collections: Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act

     Virginia and almost all other states have adopted the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA) (Virginia Code §8.01-465.1 et seq.). In so doing, creditors may enforce out-of-state judgments by properly filing the foreign judgment in a Virginia Circuit Court. Virginia Code §8.01-465.2 states:
                     The Clerk must treat the foreign judgment in the same manner

                     as a judgment of the circuit court of any city or county

                     of this Commonwealth. A judgment so filed has the same

                     effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, and

                     proceedings for reopening, vacating or staying as a judgment

                     of a circuit court of any city or county of this Commonwealth

                     and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.

     As creditors it is important to be aware that out-of-state judgments can be enforced in Virginia, and that Virginia judgments can be enforced in foreign states, provided that the state has adopted the UEFJA.
     In Virginia, Code §8.01-465.5 allows bringing an action to enforce an out-of-state judgment in lieu of proceeding under the Uniform Act, if you so desire. Virginia Code §8.01-389(B) states:
     Every court of this Commonwealth shall give such records of courts not of this Commonwealth the full faith and credit given to them in the courts of the jurisdiction from whence they come.
     Virginia Code §8.01-252 states that an action brought in Virginia to enforce a judgment rendered in another state shall not be barred by the laws of the other state. The Code bars action upon a judgment rendered more than ten years before the commencement of the suit.
     In the case of Atlantic Funding Corp. v. Peterson, the Fairfax County Circuit Court granted a debtor's motion to quash debtor interrogatories because the creditor had failed to file the federal judgment pursuant to the UEFJA, and thus, the Clerk of the Circuit Court could not treat the federal judgment as a judgment of the Virginia state court.
     Virginia Code §8.01-447 governs the docketing of judgments and decrees of federal district courts in Virginia state courts. That provision clearly requires the Clerk of the Circuit Court to treat it in the same manner all judgments rendered within the Commonwealth when docketing judgments. The statute speaks only to the process of docketing judgments, however. It does not necessarily provide a method of enforcing docketed judgments, and it does not authorize the clerk to treat docketed judgments from local federal courts as docketed judgments of this circuit court.
     In Peterson the Fairfax Circuit Court ruled that unlike Virginia Code §8.01-447, the UEFJA clearly requires identical treatment and enforcement of properly filed federal and state court judgments. Had the judgment creditor properly filed the judgment of the District Court, the Clerk of the Circuit Court would have been compelled to enforce that judgment as a judgment of the Circuit Court. The Fairfax Circuit Court ruled that the record in Peterson, however, revealed that the creditor failed to authenticate the District Court judgment, or to pay the fee prescribed in Virginia Code §14.1-112(22). The Court ruled that since the creditor did not properly file the District Court judgment in Peterson it was not entitled to the benefits of the UEFJA.

Foreclosure: Deed in lieu of Foreclosure

     In certain cases it may be more practical for the lender to seek or accept from the borrower a deed in lieu of foreclosure rather than incur the expense of foreclosure – this is at the lender’s discretion. If the lender agrees, in return for voluntarily surrendering the property, the borrower will seek either partial or complete satisfaction of the debt.
     Considerations. Before accepting the deed in lieu of foreclosure, the lender must consider many matters:
     1. Value of the property vs. the amount of the debt.
     2. Other debts on the property. A deed in lieu of foreclosure does not extinguish prior or junior liens or encumbrances. Thus the lender, in accepting the deed, accepts the property with the liens. It is possible for the lender to structure the deed in lieu of foreclosure so that it does not release the deed of trust so as to preserve a future foreclosure to extinguish subordinate liens.

 

Real Estate: Criminal Liability for Misuse of Construction Funds

     Virginia Code §43-13 provides that funds paid to a general contractor or subcontractor must be used to pay persons performing labor or furnishing material. Any contractor or subcontractor (or any officer, director or employee of such contractor or subcontractor) who, with intent to defraud, retains or uses funds, or any part thereof, paid by the owner or his agent, shall be guilty of larceny in appropriating such funds for any other use while any amount for which the contractor or subcontractor may be liable or become liable under his contract for such labor or materials remains unpaid.  Such person or persons may be prosecuted upon complaint of any person or persons who have not been fully paid any amount due them.
     The use by any such contractor or subcontractor (or any officer, director or employee of such contractor or subcontractor) of any funds paid under the contract, before paying all amounts due or to become due for labor performed or material furnished for such building or structure, for any other purpose than paying such amounts, shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud.

Bankruptcy: "Tools of the Trade" Exemption

     Virginia Code §34-26, the "Poor Debtor's Exemption" section, allows a debtor to claim tools used in the course of his trade or occupation and keep them from creditors in bankruptcy cases. This exemption also applies to collection cases, as the debtor may use this exemption to prohibit post judgment collection by execution on the asset.
     In the case of Monticello Arcade L. P. v. Lyall, the United States Bankruptcy Court at Newport News reviewed §34-26 in regard to an architect's Acura automobile. The Bankruptcy Court denied the exemption based upon the classification of the car as a "luxury" car. The Appeals Court reversed and remanded the case with instructions that the Bankruptcy Court focus not upon whether the car is a "luxury" car, but upon whether the car is an "absolute requirement for [debtor] to efficiently and competently perform his work as an architect." Upon the Bankruptcy Court’s review, the Court ruled that the architect had demonstrated with his daily calendar and his testimony that the car was used to visit clients, job sites and government offices. The debtor was a self-employed architect in Hampton Roads, had practiced architecture on his own for six years as owner and president of his company. The debtor testified that although he used the vehicle to commute to and from work, the vast majority of the time he used the vehicle for non-commuting business purposes. The debtor also testified that he had to visit job sites in order to interpret plans and in order to understand the scope of the project. The Court noted that there was no evidence that there were alternate means of transportation available for the debtor to accomplish these requirements. Accordingly, the Court, this time around, found that the vehicle was "necessary", and therefor was exempt under Virginia Code §34-26(7).
     In the case of White v. Central Fidelity Bank the United States Bankruptcy Court at Roanoke, Virginia, reviewed the language of Virginia Code §34-26 and held that the plain meaning is that property which is "necessary for use in the course of the householder's occupation or trade" qualifies as a "tool" for purposes of exemption. In White the Court noted that in regard to automobiles, the particular facts surrounding the occupation and the necessity of the automobile must be examined. In White, the debtor had both a day and an evening job as a nursing assistant providing home health care in patients' homes, and whose employment contract required that she have an auto as a condition of her employment. Based upon these facts, proof that the creditor's lien was a nonpossessory, non-purchase money lien, and the fact that the creditor's lien impaired the debtor's exemption, the Court held that the lien was avoidable under Bankruptcy Code §522(f).
     In the civil/collection case of Hunn v. Zettel the Fairfax County Circuit Court had occasion to review a debtor's claim for an exemption for his BMW car as a "tool of the trade". Unlike the evidence obtained in Lyall which demonstrated the "absolute requirement", in Zettel, no such evidence was presented. Accordingly, the Court denied the debtor's exemption claim in Zettel.
     Looking at another case involving tools of the trade, the United States Bankruptcy Court at Newport News, in the case of In re Aldrich, upheld the debtors' motion to exempt various items of property, including an inoperable photo enlarger and two photo processors, as "tools of the trade" under Virginia Code §34-26. The Court concluded that these items were exempt under Virginia Code §34-26 and under Bankruptcy Code §522. The Court in Aldrich stated that it reached its conclusion from the plain meaning of Virginia Code §34-26, and from the obvious intention of the Virginia legislature, which substantially broadened the scope of the relevant definitions when it amended Virginia Code §34-26 in 1990. The Court in Aldrich found from the unrebutted testimony that the photo processing equipment was necessary for use in the debtors' occupation involving the family photo processing lab. There was no doubt that the debtors had been in the photo processing business for some time and, in the case of the husband, almost continuously since his retirement from the Air Force. It was likewise absolutely clear from the evidence that the wife was engaged in the photo processing business of a third party at the time of the filing of the petition, and that she too awaited the startup of the family business in order to utilize the exempted tools of the trade, which she was currently utilizing on a part-time basis. Therefore the Court found that both debtors were, or intended to be engaged, in an occupation and trade at the time of the filing of the petition. The Court found it to be sufficient that the husband had the intention of returning to his occupation as a photo processor at the time of the bankruptcy filing, even though he had been precluded from doing so by the contractual relationship with the objecting creditor, who bought out the debtor's earlier photo processing business and implemented a non compete agreement.